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Letter From the Editors

This edition of *Chronos* was brought together by a team of dedicated members with a new and exciting vision for the magazine. Through digitizing this edition, as well as creating a website, we hoped to make the journal more accessible. Staying true to years past, the articles selected are a reflection of the undergraduate history department at Syracuse University. The articles in this year's *Chronos* include topics ranging from feminism in Nazi Germany, to international relations between the United States and China during the Carter administration.

We would like to thank *Chronos* Advisor, Professor Osamah Khalil, for his patience and emotional support throughout this process. We would also like to thank Brooke Winckelmann, for guiding us through the website making process, as well as Mary Collier for her continuous assistance. This edition would not have been possible without their motivation, support, and pizza.

Thank you,
We hope you enjoy,
The Executive Board



Girl Power:

Feminism and Class Stratification in the British Eugenics Movement

Luke Foley '16

HST 401: Eugenics

Professor Laurie Marhoefer

The term Eugenics, from the Greek *eu* (good) and *genos* (genes/stock), was first coined by its patriarch, Francis Galton, in his 1883 publication “Inquiries Into Human Faculty and Its Development.”¹ As its Greek derivations would suggest, eugenics is the science of better breeding, the embodiment of the notion that the human species can be hereditarily engineered so as to elevate its overall physical and intellectual capacities. This assumption, when processed in conjunction with other popular 19th century beliefs such as social Darwinism and racial hierarchy, became immensely popular within parts of the scientific community and intellectual elite

in the latter part of the 1800s. A wide range of human characteristics, both physical and behavioral, were perceived to be predictably inheritable. With this knowledge, it was thought, mankind could take charge of its destiny, “What Nature does blindly, slowly, and ruthlessly, man may do providently, quickly, and kindly.”² Had Galton lived to witness more of the twentieth century, he may have chosen to alter his adverbial choices in that sentence, but the overarching sentiment would hold true; man would indeed attempt to take the biological reins in the hopes of eliminating the defects nature had permitted.

¹ Robert Bernasconi and Tommy L. Lott, *The Idea of Race*, (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2000), 79.

² Francis Galton, “Eugenics, Its Definition, Scope and Aims” (presented at a meeting of The Sociological Society, London, May 16th, 1904).

Though most of the scientific assertions behind its original conception were long ago debunked, eugenic thinking has permeated human history for over a century, preying on the insecurities, prejudices, and societal pressures of mankind while simultaneously marginalizing and endangering those deemed genetically undesirable. The numerous manifestations of eugenics have proven its interpretation and subsequent application to be highly subjective, rendering the respective repercussions equally diverse. Some, such as the fatality-heavy Nazi iteration, have proven grossly inhumane, whereas others, for example the contraceptive efforts of Margaret Sanger, have toed the line between eugenic and health conscious.³ Some eugenic initiatives have targeted specific ethnic groups, some have focused on mental functioning and behavioral deviance, while others have taken aim at a particular socio-economic class. Some have resulted in sterilizations, some in abortions, and some in death. Many have been justified on the grounds of population control and social cost. Nevertheless, all have attempted to impede the procreation of the undesirable.

While eugenic policies attained significant political influence in a number of countries, most prominently the United States and Germany, the British eugenics movement failed to gain the same degree of formal traction. A number of the leading eugenic advocates, Galton included, were British, and The Eugenics Society, a London-based lobby group of world renown, was founded and chaired by Brits. Furthermore, there was a dire need for an improvement to the urban infrastructure in post-industrial Britain; urban landscapes were swelling beyond sustainable levels and crime, disease, and poverty ran rampant. These conditions, which would

seem vulnerable to the rhetoric of population control, were occurring in the birthplace of eugenic thought. Why then, did eugenics not realize political success in Britain? “The Role of Feminism and Class Stratification in the British Eugenics Movement” will seek to identify the reason for this failure, while also examining the role of socio-economic stratification and feminism in the hopes of diagnosing the causal and finalizing agents at work. Positing that the confluence of the urban population crises and the rise of the New Woman ideal created an avenue of influence for upper class British feminists, this paper will then discuss the constructive and detrimental ramifications of this influence.

Leading British feminists of the early twentieth century frequently relied on popular political and scientific journals to disseminate their opinions. A number of these journals, as well as conference memorandums and book reviews, will therefore be drawn upon to answer the questions and support the claims of this paper. In addition, several academic articles and books will be referenced to provide background information.

Existing Literature

The existing historical literature surrounding the British eugenics movement is vast and comprehensive, touching on aspects such as class conflict, feminist involvement, political and scientific opposition, and the varying schools of eugenic thought of the period from 1870-1940. A number of analytical journal articles have been written about the very aspects of the movement examined in this paper, such as feminism, classism, and the eventual decline of the Eugenics Society. Because of this, much of the knowledge that informs this piece has been garnered directly from these articles. However, no

³ Henry Friedlander, *The Origins of Nazi Genocide: From Euthanasia to The Final Solution* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995); Joanna Schoen, *Choice and Coercion*

(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2005).

publication has, to date, been encountered that addresses the relationship between class and gender and its role in the movement's popularization and decline. This paper will therefore explore an analytical vacuum, drawing upon primary sources to provide evidence of the sentiments held by politicians and activists.

The most prominent, informed, and insightful pieces that could be found on the topic are as follows. "Eugenics in Britain" is an article by Donald Mackenzie that was extremely helpful in understanding the historical background behind the movement and also brought into consideration other historical events, such as the Boer War, that would have otherwise gone unconsidered.⁴ The article, while lacking some specifics, provides a solid and cohesive account of the eugenic movement from 1900 to 1914. "Feminism and Eugenics in Germany and Britain, 1900-1940: A Comparative Perspective," by Ann Taylor Allen illustrates the crucial role of British feminists in the movement, detailing their achievements and involvement in legislative reform efforts.⁵ While she discusses feminism as a causal agent, Allen does not touch on its role in the movement's failure.

John Macnicol's "The Voluntary Sterilization Campaign in Britain, 1918-39" provides an in depth account of the attempt to legalize sterilization, and was crucial to understanding the significance of its failure.⁶ Macnicol also proposes some very thought-provoking ideas related to the

decline of the movement in Britain. "Eugenic Love," a book by Angelique Richardson, provided an essential understanding of the motivations of the New Woman awakening and introduced key actors, authors of both fiction and prose, who strongly advocated for eugenic legislation.⁷

Richard Soloway's "Demography and Degeneration," as well as Matthew Thomson's "The Problem of Mental Deficiency" will also be relied upon to provide insight into the political infiltrations, or lack thereof, made by the movement in Britain.⁸

British Eugenics: An Issue of Class

The British eugenic movement, as mentioned earlier, was born out of a socio-economic shift in the second half of the nineteenth century. As late-industrial urban migration increased, Britain's cities, especially London, began to swell to unruly sizes. Poverty and unemployment ran rampant and living conditions bred disease. Crime rates spiked, violence intensified, and a large swath of the population was forced into life on the streets.⁹ "Not only does [overcrowding] conduce to the spread of all ordinary infections," wrote Dr. Mary Scharlieb in 1917, "but also to the propagation of tuberculosis and venereal diseases. Worse... is the inevitable disaster of the blunting of the moral sense of people, the impossibility of decency and of self-respect."¹⁰

⁴ Donald Mackenzie, "Eugenics in Britain," *Social Studies of Science* 6 (1976).

⁵ Ann Taylor Allen, "Feminism and Eugenics in Germany and Britain, 1900-1940: A Comparative Perspective," *German Studies Review* 23 (2000).

⁶ John Macnicol, "The Voluntary Sterilization Campaign in Britain, 1918-39," *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 2 (1992).

⁷ Angelique Richardson, *Love and Eugenics in the Late Nineteenth Century: Rational Reproduction and the New Woman* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

⁸ Matthew Thomson, *The Problem of Mental Deficiency: Eugenics, Democracy, and Social Policy in Britain c. 1870-1959* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998); Richard Soloway, *Demography and Degeneration: Eugenics and the Declining Birthrate in Twentieth Century Britain* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1995).

⁹ Richardson, 19.

¹⁰ Mary Scharlieb, "National Baby Week," *Fortnightly Review* (1917), 98.

After the failure of more commonplace solutions to urban strife, such as social work and charitable investment, the eugenic alternative, social control through procreative inhibition, began to gain steam. Though Francis Galton's initial musings had focused on positive eugenics, or tactics that encouraged better reproductive choices, towards the end of the century he wrote increasingly of the need for negative eugenics, practices that would prevent the birth of undesirable offspring¹¹. These intrusive measures were validated by reports like the following from the *British Medical Journal*, "The poor and degenerate class of parents naturally lived in poor and unsuitable areas, e.g., slum districts, and the feeble-minded person was usually found to come from parents of these types."¹² Intellectual elites, concerned that British imperial superiority was being undermined, found themselves desperate for an answer to "the residuum."¹³ Presented with a solution that was thought to be scientifically sound and which simultaneously touted their innate superiority as members of 'the sophisticated,' much of the professional middle class latched on firmly to Galton's proposals. These people viewed eugenics as a scientific revolution, one that would forever alter the reproductive norm while serving two mutually perpetuating purposes; the elimination of the degenerative lower class and the solidification of upper class privilege.

This reverent fascination would continue through the turn of the century, gaining more diverse public approval, including that of notable politicians and free thinkers such as Neville Chamberlain

and H.G. Wells. In 1907, the Eugenics Education Society (EES) was established with Galton as its president.¹⁴ By the turn of the decade the society would be joined by a slew of likeminded organizations. Together they committed themselves to the goal of eugenic institutionalization, hoping to permeate legislation surrounding family planning and population control using its better breeding rhetoric. As a result, in 1913, the Mental Deficiency Act was signed into law, mandating the institutionalization of the allegedly feeble-minded and mentally deficient.¹⁵ While the law did not directly address sexual reproduction, it was eugenically inspired. By confining members of the 'unfit' to hospitals and other centers, the law sought to eliminate potentially procreative interactions with the general public. Though this was a step in the right direction for eugenicists, it would by no means suffice. Over the course of the next two decades, the EES would push for more eugenically influenced legislation, even changing its name to 'The Eugenics Society' in 1926 in a presumed attempt to streamline its message.¹⁶ Though some quasi-eugenic laws – the National Insurance Act, Family Allowances, and the Maternal and Child Health Act -- were passed around the time of WWI, the British eugenic effort culminated in a late 1920's push for legalized voluntary sterilizations.¹⁷ As the third section of this paper will examine in more depth, the sterilization bill was defeated and the British eugenic movement was thenceforth a futile cause, unable to gain any semblance of political traction.

Feminist Influence

¹¹ Donald Mackenzie, "Eugenics in Britain," *Social Studies of Science* 6 (1976): 509.

¹² "Voluntary Sterilization: Eugenics Society's Conference," *The British Medical Journal* 1/3726 (1932), 1046.

¹³ Mackenzie, "Eugenics in Britain," 503.

¹⁴ Allen, 480.

¹⁵ Mackenzie, 517.

¹⁶ Allen, 593.

¹⁷ John Macnicol, "The Voluntary Sterilization Campaign in Britain, 1918-39," *Journal of the History of Sexuality* 2 (1992), 427.

Though eugenics is contemporarily conceived of as a fundamentally misogynistic practice, British feminists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were perhaps the most vocal and influential eugenic activists involved with the British movement.

As ideas about a 'New Woman' -- one who is emancipated from patriarchal control, sexually liberated, and civically participatory -- started to gain widespread popularity in the 1870s, feminist writers and thinkers began to advocate for a greater empowerment of women in the realm of reproduction. These educated and defiant women were typically found in the middle and upper classes, giving them a dually important identity for the purposes of this analysis. Acutely aware of the 'threat' posed by an increasingly violent, unhealthy, and impoverished lower class, feminists took this opportunity to display their uniquely feminine utility. Adopting a eugenic rhetoric of decreased procreation among undesirable families, these early feminists argued that if women were empowered with more reproductive authority, fewer children would be born to ill-equipped or degenerative couples, societal tensions would hence be eased, and Britain could regain its imperial superiority.¹⁸ Upon establishing Britain's first free birth control clinic, Marie Stopes wrote, "here Mothers will be considered not only as the producers of mere babies, but as the creators of splendid babies. Only Motherhood which is in the control of the Mother can now truly advance our race."¹⁹

Accompanying this rhetoric was the more-than-substantial involvement of feminists, and women in general, in eugenic organizations and societies. The Eugenics Society itself was actually the brainchild of notable feminist activist Sybil Gotto, who in 1907 persuaded Francis Galton to

become the organization's first president. Because of her ties to a number of suffrage societies and advocacy groups, Gotto was able to recruit a large body of likeminded women to the Society, resulting in an initial female membership of over forty percent. Half of the first board of directors were women, and Gotto, as secretary, oversaw an office of female volunteers; not only were women heavily involved in the Eugenics Education Society, they possessed positions of authority.²⁰ Such a significant support base gave credence to these women's aspirations in a political establishment that was still a male dominated arena. Over the course of the next two decades, women would prove themselves as the most effective proponents of eugenic legislation, succeeding in passing several bills aimed at increasing maternal health and independence. Though these bills sometimes carried much more blatantly eugenic stipulations than their female lobbyists intended, they would not have come about at all had it not been for the relentless advocacy of the feminist contingent.²¹

Though most male eugenicists had no interest in furthering the civil liberties of women, they were responsive to initiatives centered on principles of population control and family planning. Feminists thus structured their arguments so as to emphasize the eugenic impact of their proposals. Maternal health, they asserted, benefited not only individual mothers, but also the community at large. Healthier mothers produced healthier children, who would grow into productive members of society, unlike the offspring of the malnourished and destitute. This association between maternal and societal fortitude was evidently forged successfully.

¹⁸ Richardson, 30.

¹⁹ Marie Stopes, *The Mothers' Clinic for Birth Control*, (London: The Clinic), 3-4.

²⁰ Allen, 480.

²¹ *Ibid*, 490.

In 1911 the National Insurance Act was implemented, providing coverage for the cost of childbirth and delivery to all new mothers. Six years later, buoyed by wartime pronatalist concerns, leading feminists Eleanor Rathbone, Mary Stocks, and Maude Royden founded the Family Endowment Society (FES), which awarded government subsidies to child-rearing mothers. “The nation has awakened to the importance of ‘child supply’,” Rathbone stated, before going on to explain that family allowances were “shifting the primary cost of rearing future generations from the shoulders of individual fathers to those of the state.”²² The 1918 Maternal and Child Health Act was similarly advantageous for women, allocating subsidies to local municipalities for the purpose of “intervention in the health of women and children.”²³

By securing the prioritization of maternal health and safe childbirth, feminists had succeeded in equating the health of the average mother with that of the nation’s future generations. While this development was a prominent victory for women’s rights, it was less of a victory for eugenicists. Both acts helped to ensure the health of newborns -- an important building block in the establishment of a better Britain – but they targeted neither low-income families nor the feebleminded, whose procreation was perceived as weakening the gene pool. From their perspective, British eugenicists needed to direct the movement in a more purist direction, one that focused not only on healthy reproduction but also on the active prevention of undesirable births. However, this transition from positive to negative eugenics would prove difficult.

Legitimized by their ability to enact change, more and more prominent

feminists were moving from the status of fringe contributor to influential actor, embedding themselves in the movement’s inner workings. “As voters and office-holders they now worked within political systems and sought alliances with male politicians.”²⁴ In 1921, Cora Hodson, a strong advocate for the legalization and utilization of contraceptives, was appointed as secretary of the Eugenics Society, taking over “day-to-day administration of the organization.”²⁵ By 1928 Hodson had been promoted to Education Secretary, making her one of the Society’s foremost members. In another instance, Eleanor Rathbone, in addition to founding the FES, also started the National Union of Societies for Equal Citizenship (NUSEC). With the help of co-founder and fellow Eugenics Society member, Eva Hubback, Rathbone established NUSEC as the “umbrella organization” for middle-class feminist groups.²⁶ With support from NUSEC and FES, Rathbone, Stocks, and Royden championed the reformation of family allowances, successfully campaigning for endowments to be given directly to mothers.²⁷

While these developments constituted a significant progression for women’s rights, feminist leaders and activists often found themselves compromising so as to appease the eugenic appetite of important backers, most importantly the Eugenics Society. The family allowances issue aptly illustrates this trend. As detailed by Rathbone in her 1917 publication, “The Endowment of Motherhood,” the FES proposal would “pay to every mother an allowance... beginning during the last eight weeks of pregnancy, and lasting so long as she has a child below the age of 5.”²⁸ Though they intended to provide endowments to all

²² Eleanor Rathbone, “The Endowment of Motherhood,” *The Athenaeum* 4634 (1918), 427.

²³ Allen, 488.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 489.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 494.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 495.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 495.

²⁸ Rathbone, 428.

deserving families, Rathbone and Co. were forced to concede further standards of qualification, namely income and ‘fitness.’ The higher a family’s income, the more money it would receive.²⁹ If the parents were considered unfit in any way; if they suffered from any disease or condition, if they were alcoholics, or if their living conditions were considered inadequate, they were deemed ineligible for compensation.³⁰ While the initial proposal from the FES would have covered all families, raised the overall support for British children nationwide, and encouraged social mobility, the amended version of the bill protected only the middle class. Without mention of income and fitness, the family allowances bill had only residual eugenic undertones. Once it incorporated these stipulations, the bill had outright, class-based eugenic practicality. With their provision installed and the ‘valuable’ portion of the population prioritized, the Eugenics Society was happy to lend its support for the bill.

Though this portrayal might so far have led one to believe that the feminist movement had only begrudging eugenic ties, this was not the case. A number of prominent and outspoken feminists were also stringent supporters of class-based eugenics. “Many feminists were as impressed with the claims of science as other progressives of their era, and they did not simply manipulate eugenic theory, but critiqued, expanded, and promoted it.”³¹ Take, for example, the aforementioned Mental Deficiency Act of 1913. As Ann Taylor Allen mentions, feminists played a significant role in the implementation of the act. “Many [feminists] supported the Mental Deficiency Act which... arose from the collaborative efforts of the Eugenics Society and the National Association for the Care of the Feeble-minded, under the

leadership of the influential Ellen Hume Pinsent, who also had ties to feminists organizations.”³²

Despite its feminist origins, the act failed to promote gender equality in any perceivable way. The institutionalization of those identified as suffering from a mental handicap did not advance the wellbeing of mothers or women. The act was put in place with the intent to remove supposedly detrimental DNA from the British gene pool, an issue with distinctly eugenic implications. In fact, not only did the act not strive to protect women, it actively endangered a segment of the female population, namely those who bore children while on “poor relief.”³³ Such women were, according to the act, considered feeble-minded and therefore met the qualifications for institutionalization. Feminists had lobbied into law an act that would potentially strip scores of women of the right to the most basic form of independence. Electing to throw their support behind the elimination of mentally defective genes at the expense of a woman’s right to life outside a state-run facility, the eugenic concerns of Sybil Gotto, Pinsent, and many other feminists evidently took precedent over their feminist agendas.

The decision to support the act also indicates that these women’s allegiance to middle and upper class socio-political interests was perhaps stronger than their advocacy for family allowances and health insurance might have suggested. By targeting women on welfare, the Mental Deficiency Act contained definitively classist implications. A financially stable single mother would certainly have been frowned upon at the time and would have faced social marginalization, but her sanity would not have been brought into question, whereas after 1913 her impoverished

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Allen, 496.

³¹ Ibid, 479.

³² Ibid, 486.

³³ Thomson, 90.

counterpart was classified as requiring institutionalization.

However, Pinsent and Gotto were not representative of all feminists. The Mental Deficiency Act was extremely controversial and a number of feminists vehemently opposed its passage, citing the inequity and misogyny its policies proliferated. Among the opponents were Emmeline Pethick-Lawrence and Dora Marsden, the latter condemning the act as a “rascally conspiracy against the poor.”³⁴

The divergence of opinion over the Mental Deficiency Act reflected a broader fissure between two schools of feminist activism. Led by women such as Mary Scharlieb, a contingent of social welfare reformers strove to bring protective legislation to mothers and their children. This camp espoused a rhetoric of positive eugenics. Arguing that an increased population “is to the advantage of the State,” Scharlieb deduced that “it would therefore seem to be advisable that the State should devise means for assisting individuals to rear families.”³⁵ This branch of feminism connected women’s rights to the support of better motherhood and contended that the state should incentivize reproduction from all corners of society by offering universal support.

In contrast, a more radical faction of feminists sought to entrench negative eugenic practices into the British legal code. Marie Stopes was one such individual. Well known as a zealous proponent of contraception, Stopes spoke of creating a “new, irradiated race.”³⁶ Her article, “Wise Parenthood,” problematized “the thriftless who breed so rapidly tend by that very fact to bring forth children who

are weakened and handicapped.”³⁷ In a convincing display of commitment to this ideal of ethnic purification, Stopes allegedly disowned her son for marrying a woman who required eyeglasses.³⁸ Like Stopes, many of these feminists were aligned with more classically eugenic positions on classist racial cleansing. Forced to accept the income gradation of family allowances (or perhaps just jaded), Rathbone apparently adopted the class-based argument for negative eugenics, “Experience shows that while the intelligent, prudent, and thrifty of all classes are practicing an increasingly rigid limitation, the slum population continues to multiply as recklessly as rabbit, so that the national stock tends to be recruited in increasing proportion from the most unfit.”³⁹

It is here that the intersection between class and gender becomes evident. Despite the social welfare-oriented accomplishments of those behind the National Insurance Act and the Maternal and Child Health Act, feminists were responsible for the most truly eugenic piece of legislation that ever passed the British parliament. Just as the family allowances act favored wealthier families, so too did the Mental Deficiency Act privilege upper class women, exempting them from the threat of institutionalization. In both instances, wealthy feminists were the instrumental actors; the Rathbone’s were of aristocratic stock, while Pinsent’s status can be garnered from the fact that she was married to a relative of David Hume.⁴⁰

Wealth and elite status provided these women with a platform from which to express their views to a receptive

³⁴ Dora Marsden, “The Poor and The Rich,” *The Freewoman* 2 (July, 1912); Allen, 487.

³⁵ Scharlieb, “National Baby Week,” 95.

³⁶ Marie Stopes, *Married Love: A New Contribution to the Solution of Sex Difficulties* (London: AC Fitfield, 1918), 25.

³⁷ Marie Stopes, “Wise Parenthood,” (London: Putnam’s Sons, 1923) v-vii.

³⁸ Allen, 496.

³⁹ Rathbone, 429.

⁴⁰ Daniel Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity*, (University of California Press: 1985), 98.

intellectual forum. To forward their feminist interests, Rathbone and others then merged their passion for gender equality with the pressing issue of the day, eugenic population control. Realizing that this conceptual union could be used to further both the empowerment of their gender and the solidification of their class privilege, wealthy feminists purported that the limitation of undesirable, lower class births would fortify the national gene pool. In some cases, previously unbiased policies were appropriated and given classist twists. The original intention behind such policies was therefore rendered irrelevant, as they served the same purpose as those with pre-ordained classism. A somewhat symbiotic relationship was thus formed between eugenics and feminism. In the cases of family allowances and the Mental Deficiency Act, this mutuality resulted in the implementation of two laws; both of which disenfranchised poor women, and both of which were catalyzed by the efforts of wealthy women.

The Decline of British Eugenics

Despite its integral role in the successes of the British eugenic movement, feminism's effect would prove to be double-edged. By the mid-1920's, the feminist movement's entanglement with the eugenics movement had become not only obvious but also scorned. Male politicians and activists regarded the Eugenics Society with disdain, stigmatizing it as a front for women's rights. Epitomizing these sentiments, the Society's General Secretary, Carlos Blacker commented, "The Eugenics Society is still regarded by many scientific men... as a propagandist society, which derives its main inspiration from enthusiastic lay women."⁴¹ Blacker's own actions validated

this assessment when in 1931 he declared himself as a feminist.⁴² As the organization's figurehead, this proclamation verified the widely held sentiment that the Eugenics Society had become synonymous with feminist activism. This evaluation deterred many eugenic proponents from collaborating with the Society and simultaneously fueled the antagonism of its opponents. Parliament member Josiah Wedgewood, in reference to the Mental Deficiency Act, went as far as to call the law evidence of "eugenic cranks," ridiculing Ellen Pinsent for her "wonderful ability, such as only ladies seem to possess these days."⁴³ Shared by many of Wedgewood's colleagues, this disdain would manifest itself in the failure of the sterilization bill.

In 1928, hoping to capitalize on a report issued by the Board of Control claiming an increase in nationwide mental deficiency, the Eugenics Society formulated a bill proposing the legalization of voluntary sterilization for "individuals and others who suffered from a genetically or congenitally transmissible mental or physical disability."⁴⁴ Asserting that the argument for sterilization "is advanced on humanitarian no less than eugenic grounds," the Society's President, Bernard Mallet, wrote that under the proposed framework, sterilization would be "applied, not as an alternative but as an adjunct to segregation and socialization."⁴⁵ At a conference in May 1932, Cora Hodson, who had recently been replaced by Blacker as General Secretary of the Society, was reported in June by the *British Medical Journal* as having drawn "attention to the considerable body of experience that had been accumulated in some American states, where sterilization of mentally defective

⁴¹ Carlos Blacker, Letter to Ruggles Gates, February 22, 1933: EES, SA/Eug./C.120, cited in Allen, "498.

⁴² Allen, 497.

⁴³ Kevles, *In the Name of Eugenics*, 98.

⁴⁴ Allen, 496-497.

⁴⁵ Bernard Mallet, "Sterilizing Mental Deficients," *Saturday Review of Politics, Literature, Science and Art* (1930), 632.

persons had been carried on for years.”⁴⁶ At the same conference, Hilda Pocock, a Canadian eugenicist, cited the effectiveness of Alberta’s sterilization law as vindication for sterilization measures. Pocock alleged that all thirty-two patients who had been released after sterilization were either “improved in body and mind,” “physically well with no mental change,” or “in fair condition both physically and mentally.”⁴⁷

As the organization that conceived the bill, the Eugenics Society was logically its most active proponent, but non-affiliated feminists also supported the cause. Previously a member, Marie Stopes disassociated herself after the Society refused to include birth control in its agenda. Arguing that sterilization would rightfully permit only those able to produce “healthy, well-endowed future citizens” to breed, Stopes contended that the reproduction of the “feeble-minded” would “make probable the introduction of weakened, diseased or debased future citizens.”⁴⁸ The bill was also endorsed by NUSEC President Eva Hubback, the Women’s Cooperative Guild, and the Women’s Section of the Labour Party. The male segment of the Party, a previously reliable ally for the Eugenics Society, refused to risk alienating their Catholic constituency and rejected the bill outright, leaving the Society and its cohort of feminist organizations to lobby the bill unassisted.⁴⁹

Despite these efforts, the bill was never passed and sterilization remained illegal in Britain. Among the most prominent reasons for defeat was the concern that the bill did not propose genuinely voluntary procedures, as the

mentally defective were determined to be unable to provide informed consent.⁵⁰ *Guardians*, it was contested, could not provide legitimate consent on behalf of the individual in question. As the memorandum on the “Practice of Eugenic Sterilization” conference concluded, “The alleged dangers in connexion with sterilization against which safeguards might have to be provided were the following: (1) the danger that the application might not be truly voluntary.”⁵¹ Worried that involuntary sterilizations would abound, opponents to the bill surely felt justified in their concern when Blacker himself said that the proposed measures were lacking and that not only the mentally defective, but also the entire “social problem group” needed to be sterilized.⁵² In addition, the medical pretext for the bill was deemed by many to be insufficient. Scientific theories on the inheritability of feeble-mindedness were far from unanimous, a fact conceded by Mallet, “While fully acknowledging how little we know about the aetiology of defectiveness, and while clearly recognizing the need for further research in this field.”⁵³ The scrutiny that was applied to the sterilization debate would taint the entire eugenic movement. In combination with the fascist connotations eugenics was acquiring on continental Europe, this disillusionment effectively erased the movement’s political legitimacy.

Although such objections presumably carried the most clout, the stigmatization of the Eugenics Society for its perceived descent into a glorified feminist lobby group was also impactful. The high level of visibility of women like

⁴⁶ “Voluntary Sterilization: Eugenics Society’s Conference,” *The British Medical Journal* 1/3726 (1932), 1046.

⁴⁷ *Ibid*, 1046.

⁴⁸ Marie Stopes, *Radiant Motherhood*, (London: Putnam’s Sons, 1920), 171.

⁴⁹ Allen, 497.

⁵⁰ Allen, 497.

⁵¹ “Practice of Eugenic Sterilization: Safeguards and Indication,” *The British Medical Journal* 1/3812 (1934), 166.

⁵² “Voluntary Sterilization: Eugenics Society’s Conference,” 1046-1047.

⁵³ Mallet, 632.

Stopes and Hodson, as Allen phrased it, “damaged the scientific credibility and public image.”⁵⁴ Furthermore, sterilization was not susceptible to the same rhetoric that had championed the National Insurance Act and Maternal and Child Welfare Act. When it came to a matter as morally pivotal as state sterilization, the ‘healthier-mother-equals-healthier-Britain’ line of reasoning was not applicable; outright and unfettered negative eugenic policy was at stake. Arguing strictly as eugenicists on an issue that transcended gender, Hodson and Stopes found their legitimacy subverted. Largely responsible for British eugenics’ legislative victories, feminists thus found that they had little utility in the sterilization debate. Feminism had reached its eugenic ceiling in British politics.

Conclusion

As the involvement of feminists in the British eugenics movement has evinced, eugenics is inherently laced with ambiguity. What constitutes a genuinely eugenic policy or action? Must we prioritize the desired result, the actual effect, or is a confluence of both required? Is there a grey area of overlap, or must an undertaking be definitively eugenic or not at all? Mary Scharlieb explicitly employed a rhetoric of positive eugenics, arguing that the solution to Britain’s residuum could be found in the empowerment of wives and mothers. It cannot be discerned whether her true allegiances lay with gender equality, the dissolution of poverty, or the strengthening of the national stock, perhaps all three. Regardless of motive, her efforts contributed to the establishment of the National Insurance Act, the Maternal and Child Welfare Act, and ultimately, the Mental Deficiency Act. Should history therefore label her a eugenicist? She was certainly implicated in the movement, but at no point did she promote the institutionalization of the mentally handicapped.

Others, such as Marie Stopes and Eleanor Rathbone, openly professed class-based eugenic ethics predicated on the conceptualization of reproduction as a privilege restricted to those of desirable genetic stock. Rathbone’s inconsistent remarks suggest that her prejudices may have been inauthentic, strategically designed to secure the necessary political support for her campaign for family allowances, but she nevertheless espoused, at least nominally, an agenda of negative eugenics. These rather radical views on behalf of self-proclaimed feminists pose another fundamental question. Were all of these women feminists? Marie Stopes was an internationally recognized political and social force who published several books arguing for the protection of women’s right to birth control. However, she also wanted to strip countless British women of the opportunity for motherhood. Clearly, Stopes’ passion for female empowerment was not universal; rather it extended only to those she deemed worthy.

This mentality of ‘feminism-for-the-few’ epitomizes the convergence of feminism and class stratification as enabled by eugenics. With both class and gender-centric interests in mind, wealthy women capitalized on the upper echelon’s plea for drastic population control, proposing female empowerment as a solution. To fit the eugenic paradigm, these designs were made to disenfranchise certain classes of women. In doing so, feminist activists privileged their specific demographic at the expense of poor women.

Proving themselves to be effective activists, women such as Sybil Gotto propelled the conjoined movement to several legislative victories, one of which, the Mental Deficiency Act, was unequivocally eugenic. However, as the campaign for legalized sterilizations would reveal, this womanly dependence was not sustainable in the face of a debate that many

⁵⁴ Allen, 498.

considered to represent a moral crossroads for Britain. This was the paradox of feminism's relationship with British eugenics; had the two never joined forces, the Eugenics Society may not have formed and a concerted eugenic campaign may never have materialized. Conversely, this separation may have fostered the establishment of a more cohesively eugenic organization capable of steering Britain on a distinctly eugenic course.



The Wind Rises: A Swirling Controversy

Sean Mowry '16

HST 401: World War II in Cinema

Professor Alan Allport

In the summer of 2013, Japanese director Hayao Miyazaki released his final movie as a writer and director, *The Wind Rises*.⁵⁵ Miyazaki is a legend in Japanese cinema, and is often referred to as the “Walt Disney of Japan.”⁵⁶ He is a founder, and the most famous member of the Tokyo-based animation studio, Studio Ghibli, which has produced 5 of the 15 highest grossing anime movies in Japanese history.⁵⁷ In fact, *The Wind Rises* takes the tenth spot on that list, and it also is the highest grossing Japanese film from 2013.⁵⁸ This makes the influence of this movie very prominent in

recent history, and its messages are important to examine. This is especially the case in the current context of Japanese desires to remilitarize under its conservative leadership.

The Wind Rises tells the story of Jiro Horikoshi, the real life designer of the Mitsubishi A6M Zero fighter plane, the most famous airplane in Japanese history and an icon of the Pacific War. The film begins in Jiro’s childhood dreams as he flies acrobatically in a plane, but above him he sees dark clouds hiding aircraft all marked with the Nazi Iron Cross. Jiro’s

⁵⁵ Roy Akagawa, “Excerpts of Hayao Miyazaki’s News Conference Announcing His Retirement,” *The Asahi Shimbun*, September 6, 2013 http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/people/AJ201309060087.

⁵⁶ Tim Morrison, “Hayao Miyazaki: In an Era of High-Tech Wizardry, the Animé Auteur Makes Magic the Old Way,” *Time Magazine Asia*, 2006.

⁵⁷ “Top Grossing Anime,” *Box Office Mojo*, Accessed December 16, 2015 <http://www.boxofficemojo.com/genres/chart/?id=anime.htm>

⁵⁸ “Miyazaki’s ‘The Wind Rises’ Top Earning Film in Japan 2013”, *Japan Today*, 01/13/14, <http://www.japantoday.com/category/entertainment/view/miyazakis-the-wind-rises-top-earning-film-in-japan-in-2013>

childhood is spent longing to be a pilot but he is prevented because of his nearsightedness. In another dream he is told by the famous Italian airplane designer, Giovanni Battista Caproni, that designing planes is better than flying them. He follows Caproni's advice and 5 years later, when travelling by train to study at University in Tokyo, the Great Kanto Earthquake of 1923 strikes the city and he reunites a lost young girl Naoko with her family. After graduating with his friend and future designer Kiro Honjo, they both work for Mitsubishi to design planes for the military. Frustrated with the lagging Japanese technology, Jiro and Kiro are sent to Germany and meet famed designer Hugo Junkers who is kind to them while his Nazi subordinates refuse to help.

After returning to Japan, Jiro is promoted to chief designer and he builds the Mitsubishi 1MF10, which fails in the prototype stage. To recover from his disappointment, Jiro goes to a summer resort where he runs into Naoko, the girl he helped during the Great Kanto Earthquake. They become engaged, but she refuses to marry him until she recovers from tuberculosis. A German guest at the resort, Castorp, who is critical of the Nazis assists in their relationship but is eventually chased out by the Japanese secret police. The police's eyes turn to Jiro due to his relation with Castorp, so he must leave and take up residence at his supervisor's home in order to work on a new project. While there, he is informed that Naoko suffered a lung hemorrhage and is recovering up in the mountains, but she cannot bear being away from him so she lives with him at his supervisor's house. His supervisor does not

want to allow her to stay because they are unmarried, so they marry then and there despite Naoko's grim health. Jiro continues to work, and he successfully tests his new plane, the Mitsubishi A5M, the first monoplane shipboard fighter and the predecessor for the A6M Zero. Despite the success of the test, and his cheering coworkers, Jiro feels the wind change and he runs home fearing that something is wrong with Naoko. When he returns he finds letters left by her before she returned to the mountains, and shortly after she dies. The film ends right after Japan loses the war and is left devastated by air raids. Jiro dreams again of meeting Caproni and confesses that he regrets that his planes were used for war but Caproni comforts him by saying that at least his beautiful dream was realized. Naoko makes a final appearance to tell Jiro to move on from her death, and live life to the fullest.

When *The Wind Rises* was released, it was met with massive commercial success and critical acclaim. It was the highest grossing film in Japan in 2013, receiving \$110 million.⁵⁹ Critically, the film was praised universally, especially in America and Europe, earning an 83 on Metacritic, an aggregator that averages out all of the available reviews from established film critics on the Internet. Scoring over an 80 categorizes the film as having "universal acclaim."⁶⁰ The film was so popular in the United States it was even nominated for Best Animated Feature by the Academy Awards.⁶¹ This praise was not all international, as the *Asia-Pacific Journal* called it "one of Miyazaki's most ambitious and thought-provoking visions."⁶² However, thought provoking might be the

⁵⁹ Kevin Ma, "The Wind Rises Tops 2013 Japan B.O.," *Film Business Asia*, January 1, 2014, <http://www.filmbiz.asia/news/the-wind-rises-tops-2013-japan-bo>

⁶⁰ "The Wind Rises," *Metacritic*, Accessed December 16, 2015 <http://www.metacritic.com/movie/the-wind-rises>.

⁶¹ "2013 Academy Awards Nominations and Winners by Category," *Box Office Mojo*, Accessed December 16, 2015 <http://www.boxofficemojo.com/oscar/chart/?view=allcategories&yr=2013&p=.htm>.

⁶² Matthew Penne, "Miyazaki Hayao's Kaze Tachinu (The Wind Rises)," *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, August 5, 2013

most key part of this review, because the film stirred up plenty of controversy as well. In South Korea, activists “accused the director...of lionizing the creator of one of the most potent symbols of Japanese militarism, and pointed out that among the workers who assembled more than 10,000 of the state-of-the-art fighters were forced laborers from the Korean peninsula.”⁶³ In addition, “Japanese nationalists...denounce[d] Miyazaki...as a ‘traitor’ and ‘anti-Japanese’ for the film’s focus on the futility of war.”⁶⁴ If his film is attracting criticism from both sides of the political spectrum, those fearful of a militarized Japan, and those in favor of it, then it must be worth asking what makes this film so divisive. Is the film an anti-war film, or is it a pro-war film? There can also be another option, because *The Wind Rises* is superficially incapable of simple categorization and in that case a more nuanced label must be applied. To understand what position *The Wind Rises* takes on World War 2, it can be useful to first understand the intentions of Miyazaki himself.

It is interesting why Miyazaki chose to end his career on such a controversial movie but he explains, “He was drawn to Horikoshi’s alleged statement that ‘All I wanted to do was to make something beautiful’.”⁶⁵ This reflects Miyazaki’s own inner contradictions because “Miyazaki is a

pacifist whose father earned his income during the war working for a fighter parts manufacturer, and a committed artist who also tried to appreciate the realities of life.”⁶⁶ So this final film can be understood as a heavily conflicted and tragic personal reflection. However, despite its intentions as a film it became part of the political dialogue after it was released. Politically, Miyazaki addressed his pacifism in Studio Ghibli’s “July issue of Neppu, Ghibli’s free self-publicized monthly booklet.”⁶⁷ This booklet “featured a special section on Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and his administration’s campaign to revise Japan’s pacifist Constitution. Miyazaki declared his unequivocal opposition to revising the war renouncing Article 9.”⁶⁸ Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution states, “Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”⁶⁹ When *The Wind Rises* was released in 2013, Shinzo Abe, Japan’s Prime Minister had been pushing to amend Japan’s Constitution to allow for “collective self-defense.”⁷⁰ This

<http://japanfocus.org/-Matthew-Penney/3976/article.html>

⁶³ Justin McCurry, “Japanese Animator under Fire for Film Tribute to Warplane Designer,” *The Guardian* August 22, 2013
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/23/hayao-miyazaki-film-wind-rises>.

⁶⁴Ibid.

⁶⁵ Sam Byford, “‘The Wind Rises’: The Beauty and Controversy of Miyazaki’s Final Film,” *The Verge*, January 23, 2014
<http://www.theverge.com/2014/1/23/5337826/the-wind-rises-the-beauty-and-controversy-of-miyazakis-final-film>.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Roland Kelts, “Backlash Against Miyazaki is Generational,” *The Japan Times* Accessed December 16, 2015,
<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/culture/2013/10/08/general/backlash-against-miyazaki-is-generational/#.VnIXkd-rSu4>.

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹ “The Constitution of Japan,” *The Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet*, Accessed December 16, 2015,
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html.

⁷⁰ Jeremy A. Yellen, “Shinzo Abe’s Constitutional Ambitions,” *The Diplomat*, June 12, 2014
<http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/shinzo-abes-constitutional-ambitions/>.

would allow Japan to rebuild its military and use it if their allies were attacked, which was seen as a stepping-stone to a more militarized Japan. In Neppu, Miyazaki wrote, “It goes without saying that I am against constitutional reform.”⁷¹ This was not a surprise to the Japanese public because Miyazaki was known for his “history of leftist postwar positions.”⁷² Thus, Miyazaki’s intention when writing the film as a personal tragedy was now irrelevant, much like Jiro’s intentions for designing the Zero. Miyazaki now was fighting to promote pacifism in Japan and to stand against Abe’s militaristic government and to remind his audience of the tragedy of World War 2, despite his film’s contradictory, and ambivalent narrative.

Miyazaki’s goal of reminding the Japanese of their shameful role in World War 2 and to promote pacifism in Japanese foreign policy is very controversial in Japan. “Japan has not been as repentant as Germany” for the atrocities they carried out during World War 2, and their apologies have “often been undercut by revisionist statements from senior politicians.”⁷³ To make the situation worse, “Japan has offered relatively little compensation to the victims. And to this day there are no nationally sponsored museums or monuments that acknowledge Japanese aggression or atrocities.”⁷⁴ This is an insult to China, who became victims of the brutality of the Japanese military in events like the Nanjing Massacre, which resulted in the deaths of “200,000-300,000” Chinese civilians.⁷⁵ In Neppu, Miyazaki has also

called for the Japanese government to “apologize for the so-called comfort women, the Imperial army’s corps use of wartime sex slaves that remains a highly sensitive matter, especially between Japan and South Korea.”⁷⁶ While Miyazaki and his political allies face a bold nationalistic movement that holds a political majority with the Liberal Democratic Party, he is also fighting another depiction of the Zero in a competing film.

The Wind Rises stands in sharp contrast to the Japanese War film *Eternal Zero*. Released in the winter of 2013, *Eternal Zero* was a live action film about a boy searching for the truth about his grandfather, a great Zero fighter pilot who died executing a kamikaze mission. The film was written by Naoki Hyakuta who “has publicly denied the 1937 Rape of Nanking really took place.”⁷⁷ *Eternal Zero* exalts the skill and courage of the Zero fighter pilots and glorifies Japanese military power during World War 2. *The Wind Rises* does not have battle scenes and does not discuss how Japan waged the war. It is focused less on war and more on the individual. *Eternal Zero*, however, honors Japanese sacrifices during the Pacific War. The protagonist Kentaro Oishi is a failed law student who becomes obsessed with learning the story of his grandfather, Kyuzo Miyabe, a kamikaze pilot. At first he is told about how cowardly his father was, but then he discovers that his father was always the first to leave the battles because his main goal was to get home safely to his wife and young child. However, after a fellow pilot Kenichiro saves him during a dogfight,

⁷¹ McCurry.

⁷² Kelts.

⁷³ Kirk Spencer, “Why Japan Is Still Not Sorry Enough,” *Time*, December 11, 2012 <http://nation.time.com/2012/12/11/why-japan-is-still-not-sorry-enough/>.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ “Nanjing Massacre,” *History*, Accessed December 16, 2015 <http://www.history.com/topics/nanjing-massacre>.

⁷⁶ Kelts.

⁷⁷ “Conservative Firebrand Hyakuta Sticks to His Guns, Hardens Stance Against Okinawa, Other Newspapers,” *Japan Times*, June 29, 2015 <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/06/29/national/conservative-firebrand-hyakuta-sticks-guns-hardens-stance-okinawa-newspapers/#.VnIakd-rSu4>.

Miyabe makes him promise that if he dies Kenichiro must take care of his wife and child. Before Miyabe and Kenichiro go off on their assigned kamikaze mission, Miyabe notices that his plane is having engine trouble and decides to switch planes with Kenichiro so he can repay his debt to him. Kenichiro crash lands en route and lives through the end of the war. He keeps his promise to Miyabe and takes care of his wife and child and he eventually becomes Kentaro Oishi's step-grandfather.

The message of the film is loyalty to country and comrades, because even though Miyabe is initially hesitant to fight and die for Japan, he becomes willing to die for the man who saves his life, and that man then saves the lives of Miyabe's wife and daughter. Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe "declared himself 'moved' by the film. Naoki Hyakuta, the author of the best-selling novel on which it is based, is close to Prime Minister Abe. Last year, the Prime Minister chose Hyakuta to serve as a governor of NHK, the public broadcaster."⁷⁸ While this is disturbing to many pacifists in Japan, *Eternal Zero* has succeeded at the box office earning "\$84.5 million."⁷⁹ Miyazaki has publically denounced the film by saying "they're trying to make a Zero fighter movie based on a fictional war account that is just a pack of lies."⁸⁰ This is quite interesting because *The Wind Rises* is actually a fictional account of Jiro Horikoshi's life but if that fact is ignored it is evident what point he is trying to make. While *Eternal Zero* might be a dramatic movie about a boy trying to connect with his grandfather, the film's exciting battle scenes and eventual kamikaze mission might lead viewers to the

notion that it is noble to sacrifice themselves for Japan. While it does criticize the government of Japan during World War 2, Miyabe goes on the kamikaze mission because he is loyal to his friend and he wanted to repay him for saving his life. Miyabe also develops sympathy for his fellow soldiers so his sacrifice is not only a personal one but one for the people of Japan, including his wife and young daughter.

The directors of *The Wind Rises* and *Eternal Zero* are fiercely at odds due to the debate over the constitutional amendment. Thus, the next question to answer is does *The Wind Rises* successfully communicate the political position of its director, despite the protagonist being the designer of an infamous war machine, the fictionalization of his life, and the original intention of the film as a personal reflection on a contradictory life? In order to answer this question it is important to first consider the expectations of a Japanese audience when watching a movie about their role in World War 2. The themes and characters in these movies might have been used as models when writing *The Wind Rises* and the best place to start would be the Japanese classic, *The Burmese Harp*. *The Burmese Harp* tells the story of Japanese soldiers retreating through Burma in 1945. The soldiers sing to keep their spirits up and are accompanied by a harp player, Mizushima. He is injured while the British capture his group and he recovers with the help of a Monk, who he later impersonates to avoid his own capture. Along the way to finding his group, Mizushima buries the fallen Japanese soldiers, and by the end of the movie when the soldiers escape the camp,

⁷⁸ "Japan's Right Wing, Mission Accomplished?," *The Economist*, March 1, 2014
<http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21597946-film-about-kamikaze-pilots-gives-worrying-boost-nationalists-mission-accomplished>.

⁷⁹ Mark Schilling, "'Frozen' Outlasts 'Eternal' at Japan Box Office," *Variety*, 04/15/14,

<http://variety.com/2014/film/asia/frozen-outlasts-eternal-at-japan-box-office-1201157455/>.

⁸⁰ Mark Schilling, "Debate Still Rages Over Abe-Endorsed WW2 Drama," *The Japan Times* Accessed December 16, 2015

<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/culture/2014/02/20/films/debate-still-rages-over-abe-endorsed-wwii-drama/#.VnIbtN-rSu4>.

he informs them that he cannot go back with them until he buries the bodies of all of the fallen Japanese. This film was so popular because “the lack of graphic violence and the antiwar message [made] it suitable for family viewing... [and] the avoidance of discussions of war responsibility.”⁸¹ By not analyzing the origin of the conflict, and only depicting the conflict itself, it is easier to digest the movie for entertainment because the Japanese audience is less likely to feel guilty for the colonial ambitions of the empire. “The soldiers are presented as cultured men and they do not pillage, but ask the villagers politely for food... [and] in one scene...when they realize they are surrounded by the British...rather than get into a firefight, the British and Japanese join together in a rendition of ‘Home Sweet Home’, which sentimentally portrays soldiers on both sides as men who simply want to go home.”⁸² This appeals to the human nature of the audience and doesn’t divide them with a political stance, which helped the film become so popular.

In the case of *The Wind Rises*, it was a box office and critical success despite its mixed messages, but it is similar to *The Burmese Harp* because it avoids blaming Japan for the war. Most of the blame is put on the Germans, who are depicted as manipulating the Japanese and withholding information from them. In the opening dream sequence, Jiro’s flying is brought to an end when he sees the aircraft of Germany who are bombing him and Japan. Although the film does not depict soldiers in combat with desires to go home, the film depicts all of the characters as sharing one common goal to make the best aircraft possible as they wait for the war to end. However what fails to ever be addressed is that the technological ambition of the characters is directly contributing to the prolonging of the war. This actually makes the characters, and thus the message of the

film quite contradictory and ambivalent. As engineers they work for Mitsubishi, which has contracts with the Imperial Military. Because of this they keep making and designing airplanes for them because those were the circumstances they were handed down rather than finding some way of resisting the war, which would depict Miyazaki’s own pacifism. Rather, the film is sympathizing with the civilian Japanese who couldn’t even imagine leaving Japan much like most of the parents and grandparents of the audience, which would make the film more palatable for the Japanese. Like *The Burmese Harp*, there are no combat scenes; rather the war is animated in a style that suggests it to be more of a natural storm than something caused by human hands. During the film’s dream sequences, especially at the beginning and the end, war is made to look natural with the German airships resembling little parasites cloaked in storm clouds. The Zeros fly up into the sky to join others in what looks like a migration of white birds. However, both of these fleets are intended for war despite the fact that the German fleet is black while the Zeros are white. The reason this movie might be so commercially appealing is because it visually shifts blame from the Japanese to the Germans, which makes it easier to digest.

In mainstream Japanese World War 2 films, the protagonist is often an ordinary person that is the victim of the war’s circumstances and who struggles to survive the tragedy of the war. A classic antiwar example of this is *Twenty-Four Eyes*, a film about a teacher and the experiences of her twelve pupils during the war. The tragedies of this movie are continuous, “the teacher’s husband is killed in battle and her young daughter dies; her male pupils go to the war and are killed or maimed; one of the girls dies of disease and malnutrition, while another is forced into poverty and

⁸¹ Philip A. Seaton, *Japan’s Contested War Memories* (New York: Routledge, 2007), 157.

⁸² Ibid.

prostitution. Nevertheless, the bond between teacher and pupils survives, and at the end of the drama there is a nostalgic reunion in which they remember the old times and find hope in the future.”⁸³ The film shows how the war victimized many Japanese civilians while not focusing on the political causes of the war. The film is pacifistic and anti-responsibility because it dramatizes the horrible costs of World War 2 but the film is not ashamed of Japan’s role in the conflict. *Twenty-Four Eyes*, like *The Burmese Harp*, does not depict acts of violence. It only demonstrates the social consequences of war. The film focuses on individuals trapped in a crumbling empire, whether they are fighting abroad or at home, and uses the power of cinema so that we are able to sympathize with those we see onscreen. The audience relates to them and their difficult circumstance and sees that war is horrible and traps all who are within it. These people are ordinary and even if they were against the war, what were they to do? They would have to reject their government, their culture, and their friends and families if they took that stance. These films try to depict that Japanese civilians could not mount any substantial rebellion that would alter the outcome of the war.

Where the pacifist depiction wants to portray ordinary citizens or soldiers wanting to return home, a militaristic example of this same antiwar model would be *Battleship Yamato*, a film about the battleship’s final kamikaze mission in 1945. This film is evidently more militaristic because it depicts combat and the “‘survivor’s guilt’ of the officers who beg the captain to go down with the ship.”⁸⁴ These men are so deeply invested in their duties that they are willing to die even though they are not simplistic mouthpieces for the Japanese Empire. The protagonist is Yoshioka who is a kind officer who stands up against the more nationalistic members

of the crew when they ridicule a crewmember whose mother is American. Even though this film depicts dangerous combat from the war and its message is more militaristic because it praises sacrifice and loyalty, “the drama takes an ‘antiwar’ stance against the militarists in the crew, and presents a message of peace based on the tragic deaths of sailors who just wanted to be reunited with their families.”⁸⁵ *Battleship Yamato* is similar to *Eternal Zero* because the crewmembers might disagree about the politics of the empire but they are all motivated by loyalty and duty, just like how Miyabe and his team are motivated by fighting courageously and for the sake of their fellow soldiers. So despite their verbal disagreement with war and empire, the crew of the Yamato is in reality the aspect of the movie that relieves the Japanese of war responsibility because they are acting within the orders of their superiors. These men are soldiers and due to their presence on the battlefield it is harder for them to defect from Japan because the American Military is actively trying to kill them. Also, the strong Japanese culture of loyalty would make it near impossible for an officer to defect and make any realistic change to the mission because the rest of the crew, especially the more nationalistic members, would stop them.

The Wind Rises definitely falls into both the pacifist and the militaristic patterns of these World War 2 films because Jiro is a civilian victim of the wartime conditions and he is also helping the military through his aircraft designs. This is mostly due to Jiro’s circumstance as a character. In *Twenty-Four Eyes*, “the selflessly dedicated teacher preempts postwar pacifism by cautioning her boys against volunteering for the war, for which she is reprimanded. The bravery of the characters in the face of adversity accentuates the pity

⁸³ Seaton, 163.

⁸⁴Ibid, 164.

⁸⁵ Ibid, 164.

of war.”⁸⁶ Jiro, however, does not stand up to the Japanese government; in fact he is contributing to their war efforts. This mixed message confuses the audience because while he says how the war is foolish and he would rather build passenger planes, his dreams of building the best fighter plane allows Japan to use it for combat. Like the teacher in *Twenty-Four Eyes*, Jiro does voice his dissenting opinion during a meeting when his team is trying to find a way of making the fighters lighter. Jiro suggests that “one solution could be, we remove all the guns” and the whole room bursts in laughter.⁸⁷ But where this differs from the teacher’s defiance is that she is punished while Jiro’s comment is taken as a joke, and because of this his grievances are given less weight than the teacher’s. What makes Jiro’s support of Japan’s military so interesting is that he is only doing it for selfish reasons, which simultaneously undercuts the potential militaristic and pacifistic messages of the film. Thus, the message of *The Wind Rises* is more nuanced than just militaristic and pacifistic, which reflect Miyazaki’s intentions when making the film, but not his political intentions. This contradiction is beautifully reflected in the film because Jiro and his team just want to design a great fighter but on a larger scale Jiro, like Miyazaki, is against Japan’s militarization.

An interesting aspect in *The Wind Rises* is Jiro’s relationship to the other characters from the tripartite countries, most notably Caproni. Caproni insists that Jiro become a designer of airplanes in the beginning of the film, but Caproni was a merchant of death during World War 1 because he designed bombardment airplanes for the Italian air force.⁸⁸ Caproni seems to be justifying his own involvement in the war by telling Jiro to follow his dreams, and he shows that after the war Jiro

could dedicate his skills to making passenger airplanes. This makes Caproni a questionable role model for a young Jiro because it makes it easier for Jiro to justify his work for the Imperial Navy because he is following in the footsteps of his idol. If the plot of the movie is fictionalized, then perhaps Miyazaki, if he had the foresight to know how his film would be politicized after its release, could have taken some license with the figments of Jiro’s imagination and these scenes could have been expressed with more guilt and devastation. They could have really weighed the consequences of Jiro’s ambitions and perhaps Jiro could have been placed in a nightmare after he designs the Zero in order to communicate to the audience that sometimes a person’s biggest dreams can turn out to be their worst nightmare. However none of this is shown, and worse off, all of the dream landscapes are on calm water or grassy fields and the battlefields and the carnage of war are never depicted. Artistically, this is perfect because Miyazaki is able to depict this distance between the war and the designers to show how it could be so easy to contribute to the armament of regimes they don’t agree with. However, it fails to effectively communicate any other emotions besides wonder and accomplishment because all of the regret is just verbalized while the dream of flight is animated.

To Miyazaki’s credit, these dream sequences with Caproni do not entirely detract from his political motivations, but any ground gained is soon lost. When Jiro returns to his dreams, the fields are green but some broken fuselages dot the landscape. When Jiro greets Caproni he says, “I remember this place, this is where we first met,” which indicates that his dream has come full circle. Caproni

⁸⁶ Ibid, 163.

⁸⁷ *The Wind Rises*, Directed by Hayao Miyazaki (2013; Tokyo, Japan: Studio Ghibli/ Toho), DVD.

⁸⁸“John Caproni,” *Torinoscienza*, Accessed December 16, 2015, http://www.torinoscienza.it/personaggi/giovanni_caproni_19858.html.

actually calls this place “our kingdom of dreams.” Jiro replies, “Now it’s the land of the dead.” This sentence makes it evident that Jiro is battling guilt regarding his contributions to the war but what is lacking is a physical, inescapable scene for this to manifest. But because they move beyond the bone yard of planes Caproni is able to retort, “Not quite, but in some ways yes. But what about your ten years in the sun? Did you live them well?” This is a dismissal of guilt by Caproni and a refocusing on Jiro’s individual story rather than a true examination of his role in the war. Jiro answers, “Yes. Things fell apart in the end though” which acknowledges the terrible aftermath of the war and the death of his love, Naoko. Caproni’s response of “that’s what happens when you lose a war”, while personally comforting, also avoids responsibility. It also hints that all of the circumstances might be different if Japan was able to win against America and retain its empire. Caproni’s choice of words is so casual that it makes war sound routine and to be expected and survived. However, for Japan’s neighboring countries this is a cruel dismissal that Japanese aggression is to be expected and it makes the carnage Japan caused across Asia seem normal. His influence is made worse when he sees the Zero fighters and tells Jiro “there is your fighter. Truly a beautiful design.” This refocuses the legacy of the plane to the designer as if it was some kind of art, rather than a fighter plane that was responsible for killing civilians and soldiers. Being more sympathetic than Caproni, Jiro mourns that “not a single one returned” which gives the impression that Jiro was somehow responsible for their deaths. However even Jiro’s sympathy is limited because he only is focused on his own fellow Japanese and not on the Chinese, Korean, or Americans it would kill during its use. Caproni tells Jiro that “airplanes are beautiful, cursed dreams waiting for the sky to swallow them

up,” which addresses not only airplanes but also Jiro’s ambition to make them as manifested in the dream they inhabit.⁸⁹ But in *The Wind Rises*, far more emphasis is given to the beauty while the curse is only inferred. In the movie’s environment, World War 2 and Japan’s role in it was just something tragic in nature like an earthquake.

Caproni’s influence on Jiro is that he is making him more ambivalent towards war and suffering because history is taken as unimaginable to change, despite Caproni only visiting Jiro in his imagination. In the middle of the film, before Jiro creates the A6M Zero, Caproni visits him in a dream to show off his new bomber. Caproni proposes the question, “Which will you chose, a world with pyramids, or without?” This question suggests that the construction and use of aircraft, while a magnificent sight and a technological achievement will undoubtedly cause massive human suffering. As Jiro’s mentor and hero he admits, however reluctantly, “I chose a world with pyramids” without ever even considering visually or verbally what a world without airplanes or pyramids would look like. Jiro responds, “I just want to create beautiful airplanes.”⁹⁰ This is not only a nod to the alleged quote that made Miyazaki want to write this movie, but in reality is also a lazy rationalization. Jiro never openly considers just giving up his dream, pursuing it no matter what it costs him or the people of the world, and the same could be said of dangerous criminals or even the leaders of the regimes he disagrees with. This ambivalence to the consequences of his actions, which is suggested by Caproni, goes strongly against the pacifistic political arguments that Miyazaki writes in *Neppu*. While in the narrative this equates to persistence under the worst of conditions, manifesting as the many obstacles Jiro must face to make his masterpiece, it is evident that he should

⁸⁹ *The Wind Rises*.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

have never made it because it only led to more war. Even though the message is positive on a personal level because Jiro chases glory and succeeds, it must be evident to Miyazaki that the militaristic Liberal Democratic Party is rebuilding the military not only to defend Japan but also in pursuit of national glory. What the Liberal Democrats like Abe are chasing, could be phrased by Caproni as, their “beautiful dream” for Japan’s future.⁹¹ The message of the film can be summed up as, you must chase your dream no matter what internal or external obstacles get in your way, which is a very human and contradictory message, but in a political context it is dangerously open for interpretation.

While *The Wind Rises* was a successful film commercially and critically, it was so controversial because it distanced the Japanese from war responsibility and promoted ambivalence towards the global consequences of war because its focus was so personal. The film does successfully communicate the personal intentions of director Hayao Miyazaki to make a complex contradictory film, but the subject matter it focuses on had serious consequences for many people in recent history and in the present politically. While it does denounce war in the dialogue, the actions of the characters thrust the Japanese into a more competitive position against the Allies. The side the Japanese fought for was totalitarian and based on obedience and militarism, leading to a desire for colonial rule of their neighbors like China and Korea. Despite Miyazaki’s writings in Studio Ghibli’s booklet *Neppu*, and his criticisms of the nationalistic and militaristic film, *Eternal Zero*, his film is unable to snuff out their messages that stir a longing in an audience for the glory of Japan’s military. This is because the film focuses on Jiro Horikoshi, the designer of the A6M Zero fighter plane, a symbol of

national reverence in Japan. Because this plane is an example of excellent Japanese engineering and military prowess it is inspiring to nationalists, which is why making a film about the designer of the plane that promotes pacifism is so difficult. Admittedly, the film is artistically strong and complex, but it only considers the beauty of the aircraft and the adversity in making it and not the consequences of its manufacture. Miyazaki’s reverence for the fighter, evidenced in his desire to make a movie about its creator, corrupts his pacifistic stances because in the film he must justify why Jiro pushed so hard to design the plane. In doing this he ignores illustrating the destruction that the fighter caused visually, which is cinema’s most powerful tool, and settles on inconsistently lamenting on the abstract consequences of war. This film could be called Miyazaki’s own Zero fighter because all he wanted to do was make something beautiful, but it might have done more harm to Miyazaki’s personal beliefs than good.

Despite the protests of Miyazaki, and other pacifists in Japan, in 2014, the year after the release of *The Wind Rises*, the Japanese government amended Article 9. This change to the constitution gives Japan the power of “exercising ‘collective self-defense’, or aiding a friendly country under attack.”⁹² Like World War 2, and the designing of the Zero fighter, the passing of the amendment might have been unavoidable, no matter how much the pacifists protested the change. But one thing is for certain, the release of *The Wind Rises*, followed by the release of *Eternal Zero* did nothing but entice citizens and politicians to revisit the glory of the Zero fighter, and the misrepresented legacy of Japanese Imperialism.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Linda Sieg and Kiyoshi Takenaka, “Japan Takes Historic Step Away from Post-War Pacifism,”

Reuters, July 2, 2014 -japan-defense-idUSKBN0F52S120140702.



Deng and Carter: The Normalization of Sino-American Relations

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HST 401: The Global Nineteen Seventies

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Introduction

“For the first time, because the people of the world want peace, and the leaders of the world are afraid of war, the times are on the side of peace....I shall consecrate my office, my energies, and all the wisdom I can summon to the cause of peace among nations.”⁹³ In January 1969, when newly elected President Richard Nixon delivered his inaugural speech, “peace” was the most salient word throughout the whole address. It seemed that America, trapped in Vietnam, was seeking a new order in both domestic and

international affairs. Publicly, Beijing denounced Nixon’s speech as “a confession in an impasse” and demonstrated that “the U.S imperialists...are beset with profound crises both at home and abroad.”⁹⁴ Privately, however, Mao Zedong, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, grasped the speech’s subtle message and considered rapprochement with the United States.

Three years later, in February 1972, Nixon met face-to-face with Mao in Beijing.⁹⁵ The dramatic event shocked the world and transformed the Cold War power

⁹³ "The Avalon Project : First Inaugural Address of Richard Milhous Nixon." The Avalon Project : First Inaugural Address of Richard Milhous Nixon. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/nixon1.asp

⁹⁴ Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001): 238.

⁹⁵ *Ibid*, 239.

balance between Moscow and Washington. Nixon's trip marked the first time a standing American President visited the Chinese mainland. The Shanghai Communiqué signed by Nixon and premier Zhou Enlai underscored the common understanding of the two countries for further recognition and expressing their basic international policies in their own way.⁹⁶ The communiqué symbolized the end of the intensely hostile relations between the U.S. and China and laid the foundation for further improvements.

By the end of the decade, Washington and Beijing established full diplomatic relations. Although Nixon and Mao initiated the thaw, they were not responsible for the fulfillment of Sino-American relations. Instead, Nixon resigned in disgrace, and progress was halted under the Ford administration. A leadership crisis also emerged in China, as Mao and Zhou were ill. Relations did not proceed until 1977, after both Deng Xiaoping and Jimmy Carter assumed office. In this paper, I examine how and why Sino-American relations resumed under Deng and Carter. Drawing on declassified American and Chinese documents, I argue that normalization was the result of a reciprocal process in which both parties were determined to reach the final result. I conclude, however, that China has benefitted more from normalization than the United States.

Historiography

Scholars have examined the opening of relations between Washington and Beijing from both sides. They have emphasized geopolitical and ideological considerations.⁹⁷ Others have discussed the

domestic political implications in the United States, especially for the Republican right.⁹⁸ Drawing on the declassified records of the Ford and Carter administrations, scholars have examined how Sino-American relations were formalized.

Warren Cohen argues in *America's Response to China* that after Nixon's resignation, President Gerald Ford needed the Republican right to ensure his victory in the 1976 Presidential election. Therefore, Ford hesitated to advance relations with China and was restrained politically from abandoning Taiwan. Meanwhile, China's political atmosphere was turbulent. Both Mao and Zhou were in failing health and a leadership succession struggle followed.⁹⁹

Michael Schaller argues that Carter initially delayed the rapprochement with China due to the foreign and domestic policy implications. Schaller explains that Carter feared that the rapprochement would endanger détente with Moscow. The Carter administration also needed bipartisan support in the Senate to secure approval for the Panama Canal Treaty. Thus, Carter had to delay the diplomatic break with Taiwan and the normalization with the PRC.¹⁰⁰

Melvyn P. Leffler asserts that even though Carter prioritized détente with Moscow, he was determined to establish normal diplomatic relations with China. For Carter, better relations with Beijing would provide America with a more competitive position in the "Third World" and also strengthen Washington's negotiations with Moscow on limiting nuclear weapons.¹⁰¹

James Mann argues that Carter selectively applied his human rights policy toward China. After taking office, the

⁹⁶ Ibid, 275

⁹⁷ Ibid.

⁹⁸ Robert Dallek, *Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power* (New York: Harper, 2007), 201

⁹⁹ Warren I. Cohen, *America's Response to China a History of Sino-American Relations*. 5th ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010)

¹⁰⁰ Michael Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979): 204.

¹⁰¹ Melvyn P. Leffler. *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War*. (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007): 204

Carter administration emphasized human rights considerations in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. However, Mann writes that when Carter criticized the Soviet Union's oppression of dissidents, the same standard was not applied to China's repression of democratic movements. Thus, human rights were subordinated to the normalization of Sino-American relations.¹⁰²

Daniel Sargent argues that it was actually Deng's success as a reformer that revived and catalyzed the normalization of Sino-American relations. He writes that normalization reintegrated China into the world economy and also constructed a strategic partnership against the USSR. Meanwhile, Sargent explains that Washington loosened its restrictions on technological and intelligence exchange and was willing to normalize relations with the PRC in order to strengthen its strategic position against the Soviet Union¹⁰³

Michael Schaller also emphasizes Deng's succession and his pursuit of pragmatic policies that led to Sino-American rapprochement. The disastrous Cultural Revolution launched by Mao led to a deterioration of the economy, education, and internal security. Deng abandoned Mao's revolutionary rhetoric and advocated for modernization and reform. He implemented a new "Open Door Policy" by which foreign investment and trade was allowed and increased in order to stimulate China's economic growth.¹⁰⁴

Steven E. Lobell contends that China was also trying to use America for

leverage against Moscow. Deng wanted to boost National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski's hard line position against Moscow. Deng feared that America's detente policy would ease the threat on the Soviet Union from Western Europe and empower the Kremlin to concentrate on policies against China.¹⁰⁵

Thomas Borstelmann writes that after Deng assumed power, he realized that China was decades behind the developed countries in science, technology, and education. Therefore, he prioritized the modernization of China's economy and adopted some capitalistic approaches, including a market-oriented economy and experiments with private property in some regions. Meanwhile, better relations with the U.S. could offer China more advanced technology after being isolated for decades. Overall, China was eager for American help to modernize and reduce their perceived geopolitical threats.¹⁰⁶

Paul Coyer contends that a shift in Congressional attitudes also affected Sino-American rapprochement. Coyer writes that after Deng initiated his reforms and appealed for American help, previously skeptical members of Congress were more amenable to support improving relations with China.¹⁰⁷

However, Robert G. Sutter contends that the Carter administration intentionally bypassed Congress when dealing with Beijing. According to Sutter, key members of Congress were shocked and agitated about the sudden announcement of Carter's secret progress

¹⁰² James Mann, *About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China from Nixon to Clinton*. (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1999) : 100.

¹⁰³ Daniel J. Sargent, *A Superpower Transformed: the Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s*, (Oxford University Press, 2015)

¹⁰⁴ Schaller, 196.

¹⁰⁵ Steven, Lobell, E, "Great Powers in a Restrictive International Environment." *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis* (2011)

¹⁰⁶ Thomas Borstelmann, *The 1970s: A New Global History from Civil Rights to Economic Inequality*. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 2012): need page numbers.

¹⁰⁷ Paul Coyer, "Congress, China and the Cold War: Domestic Politics and Sino-American Rapprochement and Normalisation, 1969-1980" , *The London School of Economics and Political Science*, (2013): 300.

with China. Sutter writes that in order to avoid Congressional opponents and “the China lobby” who might block initiatives with Beijing, the administration avoided involving Congress. They asserted that a successful policy toward China could not have been reached without bypassing key Congressional opponents from the secret negotiations.¹⁰⁸

I will demonstrate how final normalization was accomplished under Deng and Carter, and how it benefited China.

Hindering Normalization

When Nixon assumed office in 1969, his administration was immediately challenged by the increasing anti-war movement and also the deteriorating war in Vietnam. In his first year in office, Nixon announced a new foreign policy to facilitate Asia’s future without massive U.S troop deployments. One significant implication was to end the U.S.-backed containment of China. Nixon put great effort into initiating secret communications with Beijing.¹⁰⁹ When Nixon adopted the new strategic policy, the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute had deteriorated to the point of war. With millions of Soviet troops deployed at China’s borders, the Soviet Union had become the severest threat to China’s security. Meanwhile, China had to be vigilant about the threat from Taiwan in the east and the threat from North Vietnam as well. At this point, China was at its worst strategic position since the establishment of the PRC. Beijing recognized that only the United States had the ability to alter China’s strategic disadvantage in the face of Soviet intimidation and threats. Mao was finally determined to ameliorate Sino-

American relations in order to deal with the Soviet Union.¹¹⁰

As a friendly gesture to Beijing, Nixon decided to remove all remaining passport restrictions on travel by Americans to China. The Chinese immediately responded by inviting an American Ping Pong team to compete in China, ending the blockade which limited communications between the two countries since 1949.¹¹¹ In early July 1971, National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger secretly flew to Beijing and informed Premier Zhou that America was willing to establish diplomatic relations with China. When Nixon flew to Beijing seven months later, he privately told Zhou that he would break ties with Taiwan and establish full diplomatic relations with China in his second term.¹¹² Full diplomatic relations were expected to soon after Nixon won the 1972 presidential election.

Although Nixon was reelected by a large margin, he was forced to resign from office 18 months later due to the Watergate scandal. By 1975, China had waited three years for full normalization. Even though Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger were determined to continue Nixon’s policies toward China, they struggled to avoid conservative challengers of the Republican president who were opposed to normalization. Ford and his advisers worried about attacks from Ronald Regan and others. He needed the support of conservative Republicans to win his party’s nomination and the general election.¹¹³ Normalization was then subordinated to domestic political concerns. At the same time, the waxing power struggle in the wake of the feebleness and death of Mao hindered normalization as well. He was preoccupied with severe domestic

¹⁰⁸ Robert G. Sutter, *The China Quandary: Domestic Determinants of U.S. China Policy, 1972-1982*. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983)

¹⁰⁹ Sutter, Robert G. *U.S.-Chinese Relations Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present*. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010): Chapter 5

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Mann, 94

ideological struggles during the last years of the Cultural Revolution. Power struggle in the wake of his death became acrimonious and blatant.

Deng the Reformer

For many years, the power struggle between moderates and radicals determined the direction of the PRC's policy making. Moderates like Deng advocated for the importance of higher education, rapid industrial growth and technological modernization. In contrast, radicals stressed the primacy of ideological purity and criticized reliance on foreign technology and ideas. Borrowing foreign ideas or methods, such as material incentives, they argued was deviation from pure Communism. Radicals had a strong antipathy towards the outside world.¹¹⁴ The so-called "Gang of Four," who typified radicals and partially gained control of government policies during the later stage of the Cultural Revolution, reprimanded the rapprochement with the United States.¹¹⁵

After the Gang of Four was purged in July 1977, Deng eventually resumed his posts as the Vice Chairman of the Communist Party of China, the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission, and the Vice Premier. However, Deng still had to contend with Hua Goafeng, the Chairman of the Party. Hua was a loyal advocate of Mao's radical leftist ideology and he implemented policies that upheld the "Two Whatevers," which proclaimed that "We will resolutely uphold whatever policy decisions the Chairman made, and unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave." This extreme policy did not help

China recover from the disastrous Cultural Revolution. Instead, it goaded the Chinese people into further class struggle and neglected economic reform.¹¹⁶

In July 1977, in a speech made at the Third Plenary Session of the Tenth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Deng implicitly challenged Hua, stating that "in saying that we should use as our guide genuine Mao Zedong Thought taken as an integral whole, I mean that we should have a correct and comprehensive understanding of Mao Zedong Thought...only in this way can be sure that we are not fragmenting Mao Zedong Thought, distorting or debasing it."¹¹⁷ *Guangming Daily*, an influential newspaper run by the CPC Central Committee, published an article named "Practice is the Sole Criterion for Testing Truth" which followed Deng's permission. The article censured and countered the "Two Whatevers," arguing that it had betrayed the authentic Marxism that had overlooked the scientific laws, constrained people's mind and would only hamper the progress of the society.¹¹⁸ It produced heated discussion and gained support from many veteran cadres in the party. From this point, radically leftist ideas started to abate, and Deng's pragmatic approach started to prevail and laid the ideological foundations for further reform.

Deng stressed pragmatic solutions to material problems and insisted the primacy of economic growth and the modernization of industry, national defense and science and technology.¹¹⁹ In a talk with two leading comrades, Deng emphasized that "the key to achieving

¹¹⁴Schaller, 196

¹¹⁵ The "Gang of Four" included Mao's third wife, Jiang Qing, and Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao, and Yao Wenyuan. They were the radicals who almost took power after post-Mao era

¹¹⁶ Gong, Li, and Jingqing Zhou. *Deng Xiaoping Zai Zhong Da Li Shi Guan Tou*. Di 1 Ban. ed. (Beijing Shi: Zhong Gong Zhong Yang Dang Xiao Chu Ban She, 2000), 103

¹¹⁷ Deng Xiaoping, *The Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping, Mao Zedong* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2006), *Thought Must be Correctly Understood as an Integral Whole, 1977*

¹¹⁸ Hu Fuming "Practice is the Sole Criterion for Testing Truth" *Guangming Daily*, May 11, 1978.

¹¹⁹ Schaller, 196.

modernization is the development of science and technology.”¹²⁰ He further explained the motives for the reform in a March 1978 speech at the Opening Ceremony of the National Conference on Science that “unless we modernize our country, raise our scientific and technological level, develop our productive forces and thus strengthen our country and improve the material and cultural life of our people...our socialist political and economic system cannot be fully consolidated.”¹²¹ He also stressed that, “the more...we are modernized...the more our people will support the socialist system.”¹²² At the same time, in order to stimulate the economy, Deng also recognized that modernization needed to utilize and adapt some components of capitalism such as market economy. When asked whether the adaption of market economy betrayed Communism, Deng later argued that “It is wrong to maintain that a market economy exists only in capitalist society...similarly, taking advantage of the useful aspects of capitalist countries, including their methods of operation and management, does not mean that we will adopt capitalism...we use those methods in order to develop the productive forces under socialism.”¹²³

Due to China’s economic stagnation, Deng and his reformist comrades concluded that modernization could not be achieved without expanding economic relations with the rest of the world. A new “Open Door policy” could give China more modern technology and capital needed for the modernization. When some people still vacillated between Mao’s notion of autarky and Deng’s advocacy for

opening, Deng argued that, “how can a new theory be evolved if it is not based on a summation of the practical experiences of both past and present generations of scientists, both Chinese and foreign?” He further castigated and warned people who withheld advanced western technology from compatriots.¹²⁴ When told about the development of China’s own creativity and persistence in the policy of independence and self-reliance, Deng stressed that “independence does not mean shutting the door on the world, nor does self-reliance mean blind opposition to everything foreign...every people or country should learn from the advanced science and technology of others.”¹²⁵

In October 1978, Deng quipped that “for a certain period of time, learning advanced science and technology from the developed countries was criticized as ‘blindly worshiping foreign things’. We have come to understand how stupid this argument is...”¹²⁶ He asserted that “China cannot develop by closing its door, sticking to the beaten track and being self-complacent.”¹²⁷ Deng, at the first day of assuming of power, had been determined to open China to the outside world. As the most powerful country in the world, the United States undoubtedly became the main target of his aims.

Carter’s Final Determination

While Deng was preoccupied with reform, Jimmy Carter also showed great interest in normalizing relations with China. Shortly after taking office, Carter met with Chai Zemin, the Head of the PRC’s liaison office, and explained that “I

¹²⁰ Deng, “Respect Knowledge, Respect Trained Personnel,” May 24 1997.

¹²¹ Deng, “Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the National Conference on Science,” March 18, 1978.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Deng, “We Can Develop a Market Economy under Socialism,” November 26, 1979

¹²⁴Deng, “Some Comments on Work in Science and Education,” August 8, 1977

¹²⁵Deng, “Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the National Conference on Science,” March 18, 1978

¹²⁶Deng, “Carry out the Policy of Opening to the Outside World and Learn Advanced Science and Technology from Other Countries. October 10, 1978”

¹²⁷ Ibid.

hope we can see a strong movement toward normalization and are concerned about increases in the Soviet Union's strength...to the extent that Western Europe, Japan, the U.S. and China can cooperate, can be friends, and exchange ideas and share mutual purposes."¹²⁸ It seemed that after the succession crises in both countries, normalization could finally be back on track. However, according to Chai's memoirs, the normalization was not even the primary goal for the new administration.¹²⁹ Progress towards normalization was still on hold.

Pursuing detente and a new arms control agreement with the Soviet Union was one of Carter's most important foreign policy priorities. He sought to maintain cooperative relations with Moscow and believed that it would ameliorate tensions around the world.¹³⁰ Secretary of State Cyrus Vance argued that China was still not a powerful country economically or strategically. In contrast, stable U.S.-Soviet relations could generate an international environment which would facilitate the accomplishment of other American foreign policies. Normalization with Beijing, Vance warned, could "create unnecessary fears on the part of other Asian friends...and invite paranoid reactions from the Soviets...we must not slide into believing that we can somehow play a 'China card' against the Soviet Union."¹³¹

Relations with China were linked to other priorities. Carter later recalled that "the most difficult political challenge" he

ever faced was "to negotiate and have the U.S Senate approve a new agreement with Panama."¹³² During the first few months of his term, Carter made a great effort to win Senate approval to return the Panama Canal to Panama. Carter also understood that normalization with the PRC meant the termination of U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic relations and would incense the conservative senators who regarded Taiwan as the only China. He recalled in his memoirs that the effort to secure the, "final few votes necessary for treaty ratification...working on SALT II negotiations with the Soviet Union... did not leave much time for us to pursue the China question."¹³³ At this point, Carter had not made a decision on relations with the PRC.

However, along with the passage of the Panama Treaty and a massive unprecedented Soviet intervention aimed at helping Ethiopia's communist regime against Somalia from July 1977 to March 1978, the Carter administration became more willing and eager to establish relations with the PRC. Carter explained that "some of the senators known to be doubtful about a [Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT)] II treaty with the Soviet Union had expressed the hope that we would develop stronger ties with China."¹³⁴ Carter determined that normalization could help him in the U.S. Senate with the SALT II treaty because it could attract some anti-Soviet senators.¹³⁵ In early spring 1978, Carter finally decided

¹²⁸ Memorandum of Conversation, Document 5, February 8, 1977, *Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter FRUS), 1977-1980, Volume XIII, China.*

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v13/d5>

¹²⁹Chai Zemin, *Zhong Mei Jian Jiao Feng Yu Lu: Jian Zheng Li Shi Gongheguo Dashi Jiangshu.* (Shanghai: Shanghai Cishu Chubanshe): 68

¹³⁰Robert S. Ross, *Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969-1989,* (Stanford University Press, 1994): 126

¹³¹ Vance, Cyrus R. *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy.* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983)

¹³² Jimmy Carter, *Beyond the White House : Waging Peace, Fighting Disease, Building Hope.* (New York : Simon & Schuster, 2007)

¹³³ Jimmy Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President.* (Toronto: Bantam Books, 1982), 197.

¹³⁴ Carter, *Keeping Faith*, 198.

¹³⁵ Mann, 96

to proceed with the normalization with the PRC.

In 1978, Carter delegated National Security Advisor Brzezinski to visit China and present the idea of normalization. Before Brzezinski's departure, they discussed some potential outcomes of normalization. They believed that "all would consider the resulting enhancement of political and military stability in the Western Pacific a benefit."¹³⁶ For Korean problems, Carter and "South Korean President Park wanted the Chinese to help prevent any military moves by North Korea and to help reduce existing tensions in that peninsula."¹³⁷ One significant benefit that Carter and Brzezinski discussed was the, "ability to quietly sway some third-world countries with whom it was very difficult to communicate...most revolutionary governments did not naturally turn to the United States...we saw our cooperation with China as a means to promote peace and better understanding between the United States and those countries."¹³⁸ Normalization, they believed, could endow America with a more competitive position in the "Third World" in order to challenge Moscow.

On May 20, 1978, Brzezinski arrived in Beijing and was first met by Foreign Minister Huang Hua. Brzezinski expressed that his primary mission was to "first of all reaffirm [Carter's] commitment to the full normalization process...to show our determination to move forward with the process of normalization." Brzezinski added that "the United States has made up its mind on this issue."¹³⁹ Brzezinski also brought gifts. The Carter administration

had secretly permitted China to gain advanced arms, military equipment, and technology from the West. Brzezinski told Chinese officials that Washington would allow China to obtain some American technology which was withheld from the Soviet Union.¹⁴⁰

Brzezinski later met with Deng. Deng reiterated China's three conditions for normalization: the severance of diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the withdrawal of American forces from Taiwan, and the abrogation of the U.S.-Taiwan mutual defense treaty. Brzezinski, accepted the three conditions on behalf of the president.¹⁴¹ Even though they still had disputes on how to solve the Taiwan problems after normalization, the meeting generated positive momentum, and both sides agreed to start the formal negotiation as soon as possible. According to Carter, Brzezinski's visit was very successful because Deng and other leaders knew more about America's determination and the goals of his administration. Carter believed that China's interest in improving relations with the United States was increasing and they were prepared to finalize normalization.¹⁴²

China's attitude towards America became more hospitable. The content and tone of official newspapers has always been an effective way to perceive China's attitude towards other countries. When Washington requested that Beijing cease their public criticism of America's policies, the Chinese responded immediately. Carter recalled that "In June, their official newspaper even published the full text of my address on U.S.-Soviet relations to the

¹³⁶ Carter, 193

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹Memorandum of Conversation, Document 108, May 20, 1978, *FRUS, 1977-1980, Volume XIII. China*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v13/d108>

¹⁴⁰ Mann, 98

¹⁴¹Memorandum of Conversation, Document 110, May 21, 1978, *FRUS, 1977-1980, Volume XIII. China*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v13/d110>

¹⁴² Carter, 194

Annapolis graduates and commented favorably on its sentiments.” He added that “the newspaper even editorialized about the Cubans’ ridiculous claim that their country was nonaligned...and China would explore joint ventures with United States oil companies and characterized Brzezinski’s visit as positive and useful.”¹⁴³ Although Brzezinski’s visit did not begin the formal negotiation with China, it had brought Sino-American relations to an unprecedented level. Huang Hua and Woodcock Leonard, Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing, would represent PRC and the United States in the formal negotiations held in Beijing two months after Brzezinski’s visit.

Turbulent Negotiations

The Carter administration hoped to reach a new SALT treaty with the Soviet Union and bring it to the Senate before the spring 1979. The White House determined that it was better to obtain a normalization treaty with China before submitting SALT II because it would be politically risky and almost impossible to fight congressional battles for two significant treaties at the same time. Meanwhile, if both sides delayed, the Carter administration would be preoccupied by the presidential campaign. Therefore, Carter aimed to finish and announce the normalization by December 15, 1978.¹⁴⁴ U.S.-Taiwan relations and arms sales were the core issues during the negotiations.

However, the first five sessions of negotiations from July to September were actually unproductive due to opposite strategies used by each side. China laid out all its conditions for normalization at the beginning of the sessions. First, Taiwan was the only issue that impeded the normalization between two countries. After

normalization, the United States would have to terminate its diplomatic relations with, withdraw troops from and abrogate a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. Third, the United States could still maintain trade and cultural contact with Taiwan except to sell arms. Fourth, no country would be allowed to intervene in China’s internal politics toward Taiwan’s liberation.¹⁴⁵ The United States intentionally set the meetings every ten days, only addressed one outstanding issue at each meeting and preferred to incrementally state its position. Because China’s strategy was to respond after America had stated all its conditions, the negotiation was actually one-sided and did not address core issues, especially arms sales to Taiwan.

When the negotiation was hindered in Beijing, Chai Zemin, the head of the PRC liaison office at the time, was also negotiating with his counterparts in America. When he met with Brzezinski, Chai restated that China would never accept arms sales to Taiwan. Brzezinski argued that America would only sell defensive arms so it would not threaten the interests and security of the PRC.¹⁴⁶ Arms sales had become a huge obstacle to the normalization process. Each side was not willing to compromise its own position.

On September 19, President Carter privately met with Chai and emphasized that America was still eager to normalize with China. He hoped that China would understand his insistence to sell defensive arms to Taiwan after the normalization because of America’s domestic connections with Taiwan. And if America could also see a peaceful settlement of the Taiwanese issue, there would be no obstacles to the normalization.¹⁴⁷ However, the dispute on Taiwan impeded normalization. When Chai restated that

¹⁴³ Ibid, 196

¹⁴⁴ Mann, 89

¹⁴⁵ Chai, 84

¹⁴⁶ Ibid, 85

¹⁴⁷ Memorandum of Conversation, Document 135, September 19, 1978, *FRUS, 1977-1980, Volume XIII. China*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v13/d135>

China would handle the Taiwanese liberation its own way, Carter was not willing to accept this claim and insisted on a peaceful settlement.¹⁴⁸ By early October, even though the United States had accepted China's three conditions and showed willingness to normalize, the liberation of Taiwan and the arms sales were still the most obdurate obstacles to normalization. A normalization treaty seemed impossible by the end of 1978.

Nevertheless, the normalization had not totally halted. During Deng's visit to Japan in October, he signaled that normalization depended on the determination of President Carter. If Carter was willing to move forward, Deng asserted that China would follow. On the other hand, Carter also met with Brzezinski and instructed him to prepare a draft communique for Woodcock to demonstrate America's determination to continue negotiations.¹⁴⁹ The draft also included the date of normalization. The president changed the date from January 15, 1979 to January 1, 1979 as a final push toward normalization.¹⁵⁰ On October 30, during the meeting with Chai, Brzezinski advised that any time before January 1979 would be the best time to reach the normalization because Congress would discuss SALT II and other issues in early 1979. Unless China could grab this last opportunity for normalization, it would have to be delayed until late 1979.¹⁵¹ No one could promise the normalization could be reached by then since the presidential campaign would be in full swing and the opponents from the Senate and Congress might impede normalization. Perceiving America's seriousness and eagerness for normalization, Deng, on November 2, indicated to the party that China should

grab this chance and try to make early achievement of normalization.¹⁵² On the same day, Woodcock presented the one-page draft normalization communique calling for a January 1, 1979 announcement. Normalization was finally back on track.

It was imperative for China to normalize with America as early as possible due to the changing international situation. A successful and consolidated U.S.-Soviet detente might threaten China's strategic position because the two superpowers might isolate China. Meanwhile, since September, the Soviet Union had transferred large amount of weapons to Vietnam against Cambodia, and they even signed a Soviet-Vietnamese treaty on November 3.¹⁵³ If China deliberated whether to send troops to help Cambodia, they now had to take into account Soviet forces as well. Therefore, an early accomplishment of normalization could reduce the geopolitical threats to China. After the unproductive November, China was ready to move forward.

On December 4, Han Nianlong, the Vice Foreign Minister of the PRC who substituted for a sick Huang, told Woodcock that China agreed to issue a joint communique on January 1, 1979. The negotiations were finally in the last stages.¹⁵⁴ Although other issues like how to settle Taiwan were still in dispute, Deng decided to take charge of the negotiations. From December 12 to December 14, Deng personally accepted America's demands that China would not counter their unilateral statement which advocated for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue and America would maintain its economic and cultural ties with Taiwan. He acquiesced that Washington would terminate its mutual

¹⁴⁸ Chai, 87

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ Chai, 88

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ross, 137

¹⁵⁴ Memorandum of Conversation, Document 159, December 14, 1978, *FRUS, 1977-1980, Volume XIII. China*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v13/d159>

defense treaty with Taiwan in one year when it expired, and suggested to add an anti-hegemony statement in the communique which reaffirmed Sino-America opposition to the Soviet Union.¹⁵⁵ However, the night before the scheduled date for announcing the formal communique, a dispute on arms sales almost hampered normalization once again. China seemed to believe that America would terminate arms sales to Taiwan. However, Washington insisted that it would continue the arms sales a year after the normalization. Outraged and shocked, Deng saw this demand as a humiliation that he could not accept.¹⁵⁶ Woodcock privately reminded Deng of the importance of processing the normalization agreement. Compelled by China's worsening strategic position, Deng decided to follow the original schedule for normalization and leave the dispute to the future. Finally, on December 15, both sides announced the Joint Communiqué on the Establishment of the Diplomatic Relations and officially established diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979.

The Aftermath

Normalization opened a new page for Sino-American relations and brought them to an unprecedented height. From January 28 to February 5, 1979, Deng made his celebratory tour in the United States and became the first PRC leader to visit the United States. Normally, American officials only welcomed their guests in Washington. However, Carter delegated Woodcock and Jones Dobelle, the Chief of the Protocol, to welcome Deng when the plane arrived for a short layover in Alaska. On the next day, Deng was welcomed with

a 19-gun salute and almost an unprecedented ceremonial honor in Washington.¹⁵⁷ In the public statement, he praised the United States and verbally criticized Soviet hegemony. Meanwhile, he also visited Atlanta and Texas, leaving a famous photo in which Deng wore a ten-gallon hat at a Texas rodeo. At the Kennedy Center, after Deng put his arms around the American performers and kissed children who sang a Chinese song, many in the audience wept.¹⁵⁸ Deng had left an extremely amiable impression on the American people.

However, the visit was not just about feasts and touring. Deng's priority was to gain America's moral support for China against Vietnam who invaded China's ally, the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia in November 1978. In the wake of the Soviet-Vietnam treaty and deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations, when China decided to attack Vietnam, it needed America's support for such an aggressive action. During his meeting with Carter, Deng warned that Vietnam was the "Cuba of the East," and if China did not teach them a lesson, Vietnam would exceed Cuba due to its larger population and military force.¹⁵⁹ He further described the invasion of Vietnam as an extremely grave matter and stated that some members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) even criticized China as being too soft. Since there had been constant boundary problems between China and Vietnam, and Vietnam had totally allied with the Soviets, it was necessary for China to teach the Vietnamese a lesson.¹⁶⁰ Deng promised that the lesson would be limited to a short period of time and would

¹⁵⁵ Chai, 89

¹⁵⁶ Ibid, 91

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, 121.

¹⁵⁸ Carter, 208

¹⁵⁹ Memorandum of Conversation, Document 202, January 29, 1979, *FRUS, 1977-1980, Volume XIII. China*,

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v13/d202>

¹⁶⁰ Memorandum of Conversation, Document 205, January 29, 1979, *FRUS, 1977-1980, Volume XIII. China*,

<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v13/d205>

withdraw the troops once China's objectives were achieved. However, Carter insisted that the best way to treat Vietnam was to isolate it from the rest of the world since it had been the first time that developing countries in the United Nations condemned Vietnam. The action initiated by China would disrupt the peaceful image just produced in new Sino-American relations and might cause further Soviet involvement.¹⁶¹ Despite Carter's insistence, it seemed that Deng had already made his decision before he visited America. In February, China attacked Vietnam.

In the face of the Sino-Vietnam War, even though America did not directly give support to China, the rhetoric in its public statements actually demonstrated acquiescence to Beijing's action. The administration first stated that America was not informed about China's intention and then urged "immediate withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Kampuchea (Cambodia) and Chinese troops from Vietnam."¹⁶² This strategy maintained America's role as impartial mediator while reducing China's responsibility by censuring Vietnam. America's statement was rather a nominal demonstration of its position and would neither undermine new Sino-American relations nor explicitly reprimand its new friend. Privately, Carter had even expressed sympathy for the Chinese in this conflict.¹⁶³ Although the Carter administration did not provide material support to China during the war, its statement implicitly demonstrated its

acquiescence. Acquiescence was also demonstrated in the limited way Carter dealt with China's human rights issues.

Human rights was a significant element in the formulation of Carter's foreign policy. However, when dealing with the arrest of dissidents in China, Carter decided to look the other way when the democracy movement initiated in late 1978 was repressed in China. Wei Jinsheng, along with 30 other activists who advocated for democracy and freedom, were put on trial in late 1979. The Carter administration just simply expressed its astonishment and disappointment instead of reproaching China's violation.¹⁶⁴

Moreover, China had benefited more from these new relations. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had exacerbated Carter's distrust of Moscow. When U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown visited China in early 1980, he informed Deng that America would export to China the Landsat Earth Resources Satellite which might be used militarily. Furthermore, in April, the United States moved the PRC from export category "Y," which contained the Soviet Bloc, to category "P," explicitly permitting Chinese access to nonlethal military equipment.¹⁶⁵ Meanwhile, the two countries also signed trade agreements which gave China access to America's textile market and granted China "Most Favored Nation" status. The access to the U.S. market offered China opportunities to obtain advanced technology and foreign currencies needed for international trade, which in turn would consolidate its reform

¹⁶¹ Oral Presentation by President Carter to Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, Document 206, January 30, 1979, *FRUS 1977-1980, Volume XIII. China*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v13/d206>

¹⁶² Backchannel Message From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) and the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Holbrooke) to the Deputy Chief of the Liaison Office in China, Doc 216, February 16, 1979, *FRUS, 1977-1980, Volume XIII.*

China
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v13/d216>

¹⁶³ Record of a National Security Council Meeting, Document 214, February 16, 1979, *FRUS, 1977-1980, Volume XIII. China*
<https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1977-80v13/d214>

¹⁶⁴ Mann, 102.

¹⁶⁵ Ross, 149.

at home. When the Chinese economy developed more jobs and became more labor-intensive, America would lose some jobs at the expense of the economic cooperation. Unbalanced trade relations would become an important conflict between Washington and Beijing in the future.¹⁶⁶ As the less-developed nation after normalization, China has benefited more than the United States.

Conclusion


During the 1980s, along with increasing cultural, economic and scientific exchanges, China and America entered a new period which was named by some Chinese scholars, “the Sino-American Honeymoon.” Ties between the two countries became closer, and a wide range of agreements for cultural, scientific and technological cooperation and trade were signed by the two countries. The United States quickly emerged as the leading foreign investor in China.¹⁶⁷ Normalization also facilitated the liberalization of U.S. control over exports of advanced technology to China. For China, normalization not only consolidated and facilitated the modernization, but mitigated threats from the Soviet Union. America, on the other hand, was given access to China’s inchoate but potentially huge market. American enterprises like Coca-Cola, American Express and General Foods entered China. The interaction between the two countries has become more frequent and dependent. After thirty years, China has already become the second largest trading partner of the United States, and the cooperation between the two countries is now vital and necessary for facilitating and easing peace and tensions around the world.

Four decades ago, when Nixon’s visit to China shocked the world, few people expected Sino-American relations to play an essential role on the world stage. It was solely geopolitical concerns that brought the two countries closer to each

other. After Deng initiated China’s reform, and Carter was determined to push normalization forward. Although Nixon pioneered normalization, it was actually due to Deng and Carter’s determination that it was accomplished. This was a moment that would forever change the world.

¹⁶⁶ Ross, 152

¹⁶⁷ Cohen, 230



The Origin and Lifespan of Food Assistance Programs during the Great Depression

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HST 401: Food in America

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To understand the origins of the first public food assistance program, we must first understand the origins of crisis in which the need for emergency food came from. The first measure taken to alleviate hunger happened in the context of a profound paradox: The paradox of want amid plenty, the paradox of hunger amid surplus, the quite sobering reality that farmers had to slaughter livestock, neglect harvest, and allow their existing food commodities to rot while simultaneously thousands lived in poverty with little to eat. It was a contradiction Janet Poppendiek referred to as *Breadlines Knee-Deep in Wheat*. The first food assistance

program was not manifested as a plan to artificially reduce prices at the retail level, nor to take food from the fortunate and give it to the unfortunate; it was to relieve farms of their surplus foods, which happened to be unsellable goods, and help facilitate these commodities within the economy. The redistribution of these surplus goods to the hungry as a form of relief was an afterthought. Only once it was clear that few people could comfortably support the government purchasing of food commodities for indefinite storage would lawmakers decide to redistribute the government's procured food.

One of the original schemes designed to address the issue of low produce prices was to raise tariffs and prevent Mexican and Canadian imports from inflating the market. Impacts of these policies can be seen in a case study of Mississippi's Tomato industry. Beginning in 1925, considerable Mexican tomato imports were occurring frequently enough that it was seriously affecting the price of Mississippi's selling power.¹⁶⁸ Due to vastly lower production costs, Mexican and Latin American imports could afford duties and higher shipping rates and still critically undersell domestic produce in the United States. Producers, shippers, and officials representing these constituencies had enough influence in Washington by 1929 to win a legislative session which drastically increased the import duties for tomatoes.¹⁶⁹ However, interstate competition would prove to further decimate many produce industries, and the Federal Government instead imposed quality regulations and could enforce withholding inferior produce to increase prices.¹⁷⁰ This highlights the willingness of government early on to intervene in the agricultural industry by withholding surplus commodities from market, but also shows the reluctance of the government at this time to buy or redistribute food, or even to pay for crop plowing, all methods thought of as unconstitutional or at least un-American. Prior to the depression, officials found it difficult to offer farmers the higher prices they wanted when the farmers were clearly producing in surplus. The principal

techniques implemented at this time revolved around tariffs and export markets.¹⁷¹

A number of simultaneous challenges faced the United States government in the wake of the depression, all of which it did not address equally: The difficulty of farmers to sell their produce on the market due to dramatically low prices; The economic immobility and joblessness which prevented consumers from facilitating the economy; The lack of food and nutrition available to the urban and rural poor. The Hoover administration had different priorities for the many issues at stake during the depression, but its solutions all incorporated a similar theme: non intrusiveness. President Hoover is remembered as being ideologically laissez-faire, and this shows in his opinions of how to address hunger and poverty. "The basis of successful relief in national distress is to mobilize and organize the infinite number of agencies of self-help in the community. That has been the American way of relieving distress among our own people."¹⁷² Needless to say, Hoover was opposed to using the Federal government as a source of direct relief. He believed that local governments and private agencies could account for all the giving required to keep the American poor afloat¹⁷³. For instance, President Hoover was a strong supporter of the Red Cross and spoke frequently with advisors and officials from this company. He typically encouraged the Red Cross to assume the role of a national relief corporation in times of economic

¹⁶⁸ James L. McCorkle Jr, *Problems of a Southern Agrarian Industry: Cooperation and Self-Interest* (Louisiana: Northwestern State University of Louisiana, 1978), 242.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid*, 244.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 249.

¹⁷¹ Rachel Louise Moran. "Consuming Relief: Food Stamps and the Welfare of the New Deal" *The Journal of American History*, Vol. 97, Issue 4 (March 2011): 1001-1022.

¹⁷² Herbert Hoover, *Statement on Unemployment Relief* (Washington, D.C., 1931), accessed in Oct. 2015 at <http://millercenter.org/president/hover/speeches/statement-on-unemployment-relief>

¹⁷³ Irvin Marion May, "The Paradox of Agricultural Abundance and Poverty: The Federal Surplus Relief Corporation, 1933-1935" (PhD, Diss., University of Oklahoma, 1971), 17.

distress. The National Red Cross did not add relief from economic depression to its agenda until 1932, although the Red Cross did accept the task of distributing some foods for the needy in the case of “drought emergency” in 1930.¹⁷⁴ This distant and indirect method to alleviating hunger and disparity was ineffective. Local Red Cross county chapters which relied on volunteerism took some responsibility in procuring and transporting food and other relief, but found themselves overwhelmed easily, especially in rural chapters. John Lewis, President of a mine workers union in the 1930’s, claimed that the Red Cross, community chest programs, and other voluntary or private efforts did virtually nothing to put food in the mouths of miners and their families, demanding that Federal action be taken to distribute relief.¹⁷⁵

The Conservative’s loyalty to the system of charity might seem to be poor judgment today, but in the early 1930s, a number of charitable efforts were already being cultivated which would mimic the soon to be Federal programs of food surplus redistribution. Religious community involvement provided some relief in localized areas. Some churches or clergymen running food banks would receive tens of thousands of bushels of fruits and vegetables in the first years of the depression, and some religious centers also had gardens where urban agriculture fed the poor while simultaneously circumventing production and shipment costs.¹⁷⁶ Even more phenomenal was the fact that some farm industries created cooperatives which planned to distribute surplus foods “at cost,” purely out of the moral distaste of letting their crops rot while hunger persisted. In

California, growers united to create the Economic Conservation Committee of America (ECCA) to distribute fruits on a nonprofit basis to charities in every state in the country. The first project produced nearly 40,000 gallons of peach butter.¹⁷⁷ This entity advertised the need for surplus redistribution, and few other industries like the New York milk industry would also make attempts to remove their own surplus at minimum to no profit. The ECCA argued surplus redistribution was purely beneficial to all parties, and anticipated the reproduction of these results when the Federal Government eventually used similar methods.

While the conservative Hoover ideology was opposed to intrusive central government, Hoover’s insistence on not using federal means to offer relief of any kind (employment, commodities, food) may have come partially from his misunderstanding of the condition of poverty in the country. Whether it was out of ignorance, denial, or misinformation, Hoover and some of his followers insisted that actual hunger was a non-issue, that the thought of people lining up for food was only a caricature of how hunger or need in the country actually worked. They echoed things like Warburton’s “Unusually poor people are poorer under these conditions that exist this year than usual” or Hoover’s “No one is going hungry and on one need go hungry or cold.”¹⁷⁸ Perhaps it was a mere issue of aesthetics, but the need for food was a real one even if those asking for it did not fit the image imagined by Hoover as a needy person. It was true that the epidemic of unfed, unclothed, illiterate, uneducated homeless people filling the streets was often overstated

¹⁷⁴ Janet Poppendieck, *Breadlines Knee-Deep in Wheat* (Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers, The State University, 1986), 28; May, 18.

¹⁷⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁶ Poppendieck, 36.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁷⁸ Poppendieck, *Breadlines Knee-Deep in Wheat*, 41, 51.

to arouse interest in reform, but it was precisely more of a crisis that hardworking American folks with futures, families and savings could not afford to feed themselves. Citizens that would not typically line up to look through the trash for food were doing so.¹⁷⁹ “It is not a rag tail outfit that is coming up here asking for money, it is the good, substantial farmers and citizens of the state” exclaimed a senator from Texas.¹⁸⁰ While poverty and destitution existed in the 1930’s like at no other time in American history, the urgency to provide federal relief came from the need of the *whole* nation to be fed. Hunger was persisting because the economy could not guarantee farmers a fair profit if no one could buy their food.

The beginning of state food redistribution began incrementally and without much input from the executive office. The Federal Government had already tried to address the issue of low farm profits and had purchased some excesses of grain, wool, and cotton in attempts to sell them overseas with legislation like the McNary-Haugan bill¹⁸¹ and the creation of The Farm Board¹⁸², a grain procurement office. But these measures simply planned to restrict the output of crops as to align with demand.¹⁸³ Once in the light of the depression, however, the high demand for food illustrated the futility of restricting farm output for the sake of the economy. Increasing the scarcity of food only worsened the pandemic of hunger during the depression, so the Federal government took action. The first step taken by the government to redistribute food was a direct reaction to pressure from newspapers, protestors, and politicians criticizing the USDA and the National Farm Board for

freezing commodities in the agricultural industry. The Farm Board was an administration chartered to assist the struggling agricultural sector by withholding surpluses of farm commodities before the 1929 stock market crash.¹⁸⁴ This measure was much less controversial before the depression, when the economy of the United States could allow even the poor to buy food and create enough demand to bring farm commodities to market, but in 1930, the money did not exist to bring together the food and the consumers at the retail level. Without the wherewithal (or the liberal willpower) to enact a more direct farm bailout bill, congress created The Farm Board to instead prevent commodities from reaching the market, thus helping reduce the inflation of these commodities. The Farm Board’s first job was to procure a commodity, and its most abundant resource was wheat. On top of buying tons of surplus wheat from farmers at reduced prices, many farmers found themselves donating their surpluses to the Farm Board to alleviate their own costs of storage and distribution.¹⁸⁵ The Federal Government now found that it owned the rights to thousands of silos full of wheat across the nation. Immediately speculation of the future of the wheat arose. Left alone it would merely devalue. Its destruction, relocation, or consumption would require some funding one way or another. The many avenues with which the Farm Board could handle this commodity were reduced to those which demanded action. Despite conservative wishes to keep the government out of the economic recovery, the Farm Board’s acquisition of unsellable wheat was too convenient not to manipulate further into a food relief program. Liberals wished to take

¹⁷⁹ May, 19.

¹⁸⁰ Poppendieck, 41.

¹⁸¹ Moran, 5.

¹⁸² Ibid, 6.

¹⁸³ Ibid, 14.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid, 6.

¹⁸⁵ Poppendieck, 36.

this wheat -already in surplus- and satisfy the pressing problem of simultaneous hunger. The radical plan would vanquish the persisting paradox of hunger amid plenty, which gave it great appeal, but the suggestion alone was an enormous step in public policy. The government had never regulated such a basic human need on such a widespread scale, and the topic of relief for those in poverty reaching congress was expected to “rock the foundations of government” as one Ohio official put it.¹⁸⁶ The measure definitely did not pass without struggle. Skeptics on the one hand were assured there was no starving class of Americans, and conservative politicians claimed reports of undernourishment were widely over exaggerated.¹⁸⁷ The consequences on commodity price were uncertain. Even a “State’s Rights” affair became a hitch that critics would harbor on.¹⁸⁸ None of these holes could sink the grain redistribution ship in congress though. After a few consecutive battles in the House and Senate, democratic and republican chairmen came to an agreement that there was a moral dilemma to buying wheat to keep off of the market and sitting on it to withhold from needy and starving Americans. Congress did not decide on an all-out welfare program for the poor though. Still wary of total government intervention, legislators compromised on merely donating the wheat acquired by The Farm Board to private relief agencies, (largely the Red Cross but also to other independent charitable organizations). The Federal government agreed to make a massive contribution to the welfare of the poor in the form of commodities, but this coincidental transfer of goods was still managed and manifested at the local as well as private level. The legislation was, to the

surprise of many, signed by President Herbert Hoover.

Whether Hoover approved of the redistribution of food to the poor was because the Government was intervening on the behalf of an organization and not on behalf of the jobless, or because he could tolerate relief in the form of food and not money, is not entirely clear.¹⁸⁹ Nevertheless, the progress of food distribution policy during the Hoover administration was slow and incomplete. Hoover and the conservatives did not accept the importance of the role government in providing food security to millions of poor Americans until 1932, when it was far too late to remain in a position of power. The election of Franklin Roosevelt would not only much more aggressively meet the needs of farmers, but it would much more graciously and efficiently deliver to the poor. More importantly, the New Deal government -for a time- would replace the fragment of the market which could not buy food as a necessity nor sell it as a source of income. It acted literally as a public channel for what the private channel failed to do. But during the New Deal era, surplus redistribution would adopt some formalities. The Hoover era wheat donations to the Red Cross proved to be successful, but this was also after four years of the President insisting that the Red Cross, local/municipal governments, and private entities carry the entire burden of economic recovery. State representatives thanked the Red Cross for its management of the flour and wheat given to it by the Farm Board, but they also demanded more extensive action on the part of the Federal Government.¹⁹⁰

Protest, boycott, and criticism of the government continued after the election of

¹⁸⁶ Ibid, 55.

¹⁸⁷ Moran, 19.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid, 32.

¹⁸⁹ Poppendieck, 70.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid, 72.

FDR. The New Deal Government would eventually provide food relief in a much more integrated manner than before, but this was not until first passing the monolithic Agricultural Adjustment Act. (AAA). The AAA was a controversial ~~and in some places, blasphemous~~ bill, and was even considered blasphemous by some. While contemporary opinions on the AAA's effectiveness are mixed, its opposition would also put pressure on the government to come up with an alternative policy to paying farmers not to grow crops as the AAA had begun to do.¹⁹¹ The anger of political activists over the paradox of removing food from the market as people starved, especially with the hindsight of the Farm Board's successful wheat donations, suggested that mere removal of surplus from the market was not enough intervention to suppress the pains of poverty, and that the continuance of redistribution was necessary to ameliorate hunger. The Roosevelt administration appeared to be making the same mistakes of the decade prior with the creation of the AAA. While the AAA would continue to manipulate farm output until it was declared unconstitutional in 1936, this spawn of the New Deal government would also soon inspire an idea which would later manifest itself as its own corporation remembered for more effectively tackling the issue of over-production.¹⁹²

In early 1933, just following the election of President Roosevelt, the USDA ordered the slaughter of piglets to hold pork from the market in an attempt to control prices the prices of both pork and corn, a

common hog feed¹⁹³, and the resulting pork was subsequently acquired by the Farm Board. In combination with the moral conflict of killing animals in surplus, the withholding of their meat in spite of widespread hunger lead to many newspapers calling government policy immoral and unfair. The first weeks of the New Deal government, while anticipated with excitement, also met skepticism. Mere public opinion (even of the taxpayer) is seldom enough to change official's opinions, but it was soon apparent that too many writers, celebrities, politicians, CEO's, advisors and experts called for the distribution of food for the needy for it to remain an experimental policy. That being said, despite the huge demand across government for Federal intervention to ameliorate hunger, the democratic process would not be responsible for determining the fate of this newly acquired pork.

The next chapter of American food assistance would be non-congressional, but the sentiment/ideologies of food assistance and more generally the ideology of the New Deal Government did play in the role of the creation of the first permanent food assistance plan. Congress, members of the AAA, and other officials all provided influence in the plan to mimic the Farm Board's distributive behavior, but its onset was set up by informal presidential approval.¹⁹⁴ Roosevelt convened with official Harry Hopkins and Jerome Frank, heads of the AAA to be a part of the General Counsel for a new system to carry out pork distribution.¹⁹⁵ Chartered as an elusive

¹⁹¹ Ann F. White, *Plowed Under: Food Policy Protests and Performance in New Deal America* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2015): 7-10.

¹⁹² United States Department of Agriculture, *Stopping Waste in Farm Surpluses*, (Washington D.C., 1938.), 2.

¹⁹³ Moran, 1004.

¹⁹⁴ Ray Forrest Harvey, *Want In the Midst of Plenty: the Genesis of the Food Stamp Plan* (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1941), 24.

¹⁹⁵ May, "The Paradox of Abundance and Poverty", 64.

executive order (unusually however, in the state of Delaware, as its laws were the only to provide a sanction for such a corporation¹⁹⁶), the redistribution of pork procurements went forward as it did with wheat, only this time it was simultaneously overseen by a new authority called the Federal Surplus Relief Corporation (FSRC), charged with the tasks of balancing the budget with which the government could buy commodities, choosing which methods would be used to distribute these commodities, and choosing where foods would be relocated to. These pork procurements were not merely donated to the Red Cross, however. Private organizations would still receive goods for their own relief efforts, but food relief had now become a state effort. This time, the FSRC would decide what states, cities, and municipalities would receive surplus goods. This was of course, on a grander scale. Potatoes from the northeast, for instance, would be brought to the west and grapefruit from the south would be distributed northward.¹⁹⁷ The methods of local distribution would be left up to the states and municipalities to decide. The Federal Government did not mandate that all surplus foods must be distributed via public nor private commissaries, retail centers, or delivery, but all of these channels were used.

Many recipients favored an unprecedented new home delivery method, in which qualifying families selected by local social work offices actually received their relief on their front doorstep. This was popular for the obvious reason of avoiding stigma. Often entire counties and some states found this measure to be the most functionally effective as well, especially in rural areas, due to the low density population.

Many city governments receiving food from the FSRC however decided that the food would be best distributed at commissary offices assigned with relief responsibilities, which were staffed by state welfare experts and social workers. Some states or localities required those on assistance to call-in and then pick-up deliveries. The Chair of Commodity Distribution within the FSRC estimated through state reports in 1934 that 26 different methods of surplus food distribution existed among the many practices.¹⁹⁸ However, the FSRC made it very clear to the states that the success of government relief was up to them. The distribution wing of the corporation had to communicate with each state government to assure that the assigned surplus goods and their quantities could be utilized effectively, and could be transported, processed, and delivered in a timely manner.¹⁹⁹ It was also up to local governments to report to the FSRC how many families on relief they were expected to serve, or to account for what crops already existed in a state as to ensure shipping of a commodity to that state would not accidentally create a new surplus.²⁰⁰ Thus, the effectiveness of the surplus relief plan varied greatly from area to area. In one instance, the FSRC sent a three month supply of cabbages to Massachusetts relief officials, who could accommodate only a month's supply²⁰¹, recreating the issue of surplus in this location. Other types of problematic issues often arose in commissaries. Some were fantastically efficient, but in others, the same issues arose in these warehouses that did from the Farm Board's wheat plan where FSRC donations were merely handed to other organizations for indefinite release without any prior planning. People in need

¹⁹⁶ May, "The Paradox of Abundance and Poverty", 63.

¹⁹⁷ Moran, *Consuming Relief*, 1005.

¹⁹⁸ Moran, 95.

¹⁹⁹ USDA, *Stopping Waste*, 3.

²⁰⁰ *Ibid*, 4.

²⁰¹ May, 197.

would line up to receive food in a much more traditional fashion, creating all too-familiar “bread lines” that organizers of the FSRC had hoped not to replicate.

Just as the Farm Board’s Federal bread donations were received positively, those receiving commodity relief via the FSRC were also supportive of the program. Though there were imperfections, ranging from late deliveries²⁰² to limited dietary options (relief packages sometimes consisted of prunes, citruses and jelly), the first food assistance program in the United States was considered a success. In 1933, relief foods totaled almost 700,000,000 pounds²⁰³ and reached millions of Americans in all states plus the Alaskan Territory.²⁰⁴ All forms of public assistance were beneficial to the poor during the great depression, but food relief was especially crucial to the many recipients who would only rely on the FSRC as their only handout from Federal arms. Forty percent of those receiving public assistance solely received surplus food as their single form of relief.²⁰⁵

The FSRC was not free from criticism. One of the complicated issues behind the morality of food distribution was that it utilized the Agricultural Adjustment Agency’s “economics of scarcity,” or supposed that reducing the amount of product from an industry would help it sell in greater quantities.²⁰⁶ While some people did approve of the FSRC for *redistributing* withheld food instead of destroying it, this did not satisfy the skeptics which suggested that this relief food was replacing the consumer need to buy the same foods on the retail market. The FSRC promised that its food donations would go “above and beyond” the current

purchasing practices of the hungry, and that the relief food consumed by them would not replace the food purchased at grocery stores, although little evidence of this was unearthed to show that this was the case. Grocery store owners, retailers, and the middle-men of the food industry complained that ameliorating hunger was done in the favor of farmers and at the expense of everyone else, and they would be long standing enemies of Federal food relief until a better system was designed to feed the hungry.

The FSCR also had a brief stint with non-agricultural commodity relief before its demise. It obtained cow hides in surplus and expected to make shoes out of them for redistribution as a free relief commodity. Despite the potential boost to the leather industry, fierce lobbying and resentment from retailers and marketers who expected the demand for shoes to plummet prevented the redistribution of much of this leather. The same behavior was exhibited by the mattress industry when the FSRC acquired cotton and began fabricating mattresses out of it: the National Association of Bedding Manufacturers criticized the FSRC, claiming that its purchase of cotton would destabilize prices²⁰⁷ and result in higher costs for commercial producers. The business class was unanimously opposed to government intervention in the economy on the grounds that its competition with the free market would ultimately destroy it.

Consideration of this resistance to commodity relief brings out one of the more phenomenal achievements of the FSRC: The ability to perpetually donate foods to lower levels of government in co-existence with traditional channels of food commerce.

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ “Relief Totals 692,228,274 Pounds” New York Times, 1934.

²⁰⁴ May, 261.

²⁰⁵ Harvey, *Want In the Midst of Plenty*, 20.

²⁰⁶ Poppendieck, 127.

²⁰⁷ Moran, 222.

While retailers and shopkeepers were extremely unhappy with the bypassing of their outlets when food reached the poor via Federal relief efforts, the moral duty of feeding the poor often kept criticism from reaching a practical level of action against relief. The FSRC's food redistribution was one of the most successful relief efforts facilitated by FERA, and this is likely because the presence of hunger and starvation was an urgency that politicians were much attuned to relieving.

Ideologically, the FSRC seemed unstoppable. However, there was a complicated bureaucracy around the FSRC. For instance, the FSRC received its food donations from the Agricultural Adjustment Administration, and since the corporation was chartered by Roosevelt and thus received no appropriations from congress, its primary funding was derived from transfers from the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA).²⁰⁸ The FSRC in fact acted as a subsidiary of Federal Emergency Relief Administration, with food distribution being one of the many tasks that the Emergency Relief branch of government was responsible for. FERA was established to contain all of the programs that would provide wage relief, work relief, food relief, or commodity relief to those in poverty. As a technical detail however, FERA was only financially supporting the actions taken by the FSRC. In order for the FSRC to give food to the municipalities that required food relief, those governments had to first buy it. But the funding for these purchases was still federal, because FERA made monetary credits to state governments which were then used by the states to purchase the allowed surpluses from the FSRC. They could only legally give

surpluses as a sale, and simultaneously, could also only legally receive surpluses as donations from the Agricultural Adjustment Administration.²⁰⁹ It was soon apparent that "red tape" was one of the bigger obstacles of the Federal Relief wing of government, and the delicacy of the relief system entailed that if any one part of this sequence should be repealed, abolished, or otherwise cease function or funding, the entire surplus chain became futile. In a nutshell, the FSRC was a purely a distributing agency: a means by which food traveled from one place to another. Chaotically, the AAA provided the food and FERA provided the funding (and in many cases, the directions for FSRC operation and behavior).²¹⁰ The lack of centralization also led to what some called a plainly poor quality service. Perishing foods and late deliveries were non-existent in a few places, they were sometimes characteristic in other areas.²¹¹ Though these discretions originated at the local levels, it was often not perceived as such, and the lack of supervision and confrontation to these problems by the Federal banner led to a brief lack of confidence in the FSRC's abilities.

The FSRC was also under threat because its main source of funding, the FERA, was being liquidized in 1935. In a grand attempt by lawmakers at the time to make government more orderly and less dependent on Roosevelt's executive orders (formal or otherwise), FERA was dissolved and replaced with an agency named the Works Progress Administration (WPA).²¹² As the name suggests, the WPA was not so much involved with commodities as it was with job relief, and was not designed to be compatible with the functions of the FSRC.

²⁰⁸ May, 65.

²⁰⁹ USDA, 1.

²¹⁰ Harvey, 6.

²¹¹ Gertrude Springer, "The Federal Bread Line," *Survey Midmonthly* vol. 75 (1939), 69.

²¹² Poppendieck, 208.

Food distribution would have to be funded, directed, and controlled by a new institution.

By 1935, it was apparent that if food relief were to continue, it required centralization and a unified headquarters. In an effort to become more autonomous and more closely intertwined with the needs of the agricultural industry, the FSRC was ended and replaced with the Federal Surplus Commodities Corporation, an organization then monitored by the USDA and secretary of agriculture Henry A. Wallace.²¹³ The FSCC was a more centralized version of the FSRC. It no longer relied on donations from the AAA or FERA. The FSCC began writing its own reports, making its own investigations, and relying on its own data. The FSCC could now estimate how much of the market it was purchasing, for instance, and it aimed to buy anywhere from 1-5% of the market of a given food (although the FSCC purchased up to 10% of available stock in some commodities).²¹⁴ It also addressed the quality issues hampering the FSRC's reputation earlier. Among the reforms during the transition from the FSRC to the FSCC was a top down approach designed to encourage better shipping practices, on-time deliveries, and improved packing methods to reduce spoil in perishable items.²¹⁵ The issue of funding was still muddy in its initial phase, but this was soon addressed once internal resistance to some of the FSCC's operations on a financial basis arose. Occasionally official comptrollers could find no reason to allocate millions of dollars within FERA funds or Public Work Agency funds to the seemingly unrelated FSCC.²¹⁶ It was in 1936 the objection by the comptroller was so strong that the FSCC sought and received clarifying statements of its powers from

Congress.²¹⁷ The FSCC was now an entity very much in charge of its own autonomy.

While the transfer of the FSRC operations to the FSCC helped to ameliorate efficiency issues and remained the core enabler for food relief efforts, it did not shrink its list of accumulating enemies, especially retailers. The business sector still wanted commodity redistribution efforts to halt or be greatly diminished. The popularity and practicality of food relief was too great to dismiss it altogether, but it was apparent that the economy would not pick itself back up if the infrastructure designed to buy and sell food conventionally was not as locomotive as the agencies propped up by the government to feed the hungry. The method of direct distribution of surplus foods to the needy faced opposition from groups like the National-American Wholesale Merchants Association, the National Retail merchants Association, and some local Chambers of Commerce.²¹⁸ Throughout the 1930's, arguments on the behalf of the business sector would become familiar. Retailers, and soon officials would demand that a new method of food relief had to be drafted which would include in the system: grocery stores, farmer's markets, and conventional food purchasing centers. This was imperative in order to avoid a necessary piece of the economy from going out of business and further separating agricultural product from the money needed to buy it.

In 1937, Congress once more had the occasion to review the activities of surplus distribution under the FSCC. Politicians privy to these business complaints were tempted to terminate the program, but again the moral determination to feed the hungry prevailed, and it was voted to be extended for

²¹³ Poppendieck, 213.

²¹⁴ Harvey, 11.

²¹⁵ Springer, 69.

²¹⁶ Harvey, 25.

²¹⁷ Ibid, 26.

²¹⁸ Ibid, 24.

at least another two years.²¹⁹ This time around, the conflicts of business and export markets were being considered greatly in the re-formulating of the food relief plan. Among other clarifications, congress noted that funding and direction of the FSCC was to come from the US Department of Agriculture, and was designed to serve their dominant interests. In 1937, Henry Wallace, head of the USDA, made the goal of the FSCC to focus more on agricultural accommodations rather than to feed the poor, strictly limiting some of the crops and quantities available for surplus donation. This was done with the hopes that it would prevent unwanted competition with traditional routs of food purchasing in America and would restore wholesale and retail purchase.²²⁰ Wallace asked for funds to take surplus wheat and cotton crops and export them overseas to waring countries to revive agricultural prices at a lower cost to the USDA and FSCC, but this also meant that the FSCC was not as accurately responding to the domestic relief crisis as it had once before.²²¹ This was timed poorly because simultaneously in 1937, Roosevelt was revisiting the values of budget balancing, and as a result the budgets of many agencies like the WPA and FSCC were cut. Millions of layoffs followed, and by April 1938, an estimated 4 million more people lost work.²²² Thanks to the pressure from the retail industry, reduced government spending, and additionally a phenomenally plentiful wheat crop in 1938, the FSCC was now executing a policy of surplus procurement for the agricultural sector when again millions of people were in dire need of food. Budget cuts forced welfare offices to shut their doors and

the paradox of want amid plenty appeared to grow stronger, if at least momentarily.²²³

1939 arrived. Its congressional review was soon due. Mounting surpluses combined with the new “recession” forced officials in the USDA to refocus. Wallace placed Milo Perkins as head of the FSCC, an official who had long proposed that the solution to the FSCC’s malfunction was to design a plan to encourage more domestic consumption of wheat, instead of exporting it to waring Europe.²²⁴ As congress discussed what was to be done with the institution which now was unpopular with business, underfunded by Roosevelt, and appeared to be failing, officials were still working on a way to revive its activities in a more convenient and domestic fashion as to continue to provide some sort of answer to the paradox of hunger in America.

Together, Secretary of Agriculture Henry A. Wallace and head of FSCC Milo Perkins invited and discussed among business representatives and key people among the trade, welfare, and farm industries how to develop a business-like way of providing food relief.²²⁵ Among the many plans put forward to congress to alter the food surplus program was the composite result of these meetings, often with great credit given to Milo Perkins: The Food Stamp Plan. This plan was designed to give as many social benefits as possible to all parties. In the cities that chose to accommodate the new rules, the expanded program would include working families with low incomes, , not just those who were unemployed and on relief.²²⁶ More importantly, the Food Stamp Plan was engineered around cooperation with retail

²¹⁹ Ibid, 25.

²²⁰ Poppendieck, 205.

²²¹ Ibid, 240.

²²² Ibid, 234.

²²³ Poppendieck, 236.

²²⁴ Ibid, 141.

²²⁵ Milo Perkins, *Eating the Surplus through the Food Stamp Plan* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1941): 10.

²²⁶ Harvey, 20.

channels. To avoid cooperation with private milk distributors for instance, relief clients were required to declare how much milk they had been purchasing before application to the program.²²⁷ The Federal corporation would also collaborate with the Bureau of Home Economics in order to better prescribe surplus goods to needy families.²²⁸ Boxes of surplus would even be marked, “Relief: Not to be sold” in order to assure that stamps marked “surplus purchasing” would only purchase surplus foods.²²⁹ Many new measures were taken to assure that surplus foods were to be supplemental to the diets of the needy and merely additional to the foods that they were already purchasing.

The most fundamental changes made by Perkins’ food stamp plan were based on the sequence of payments which would ultimately reach the farmer. First, yet another new agency would be chartered, aptly titled the Surplus Marketing Agency (SMA). The SMA “would *not* go into the market to purchase commodities” Perkins explained.²³⁰ The SMA would instead distribute stamps tender for the purchase solely of surplus food stuffs. This meant that the Federal Government would not be giving any money to any farmers, nor would it be giving any food to any states or relief organizations. The radical Food Stamp Plan would instead give *buying power* to clients. Instead of the government buying commodities and giving to the poor (in essence facilitating a transaction with farmers and leaving wholesalers and retailers out of the picture), clients would make grocery orders or wholesale orders, giving their stamps to these middlemen who could then bank them or redeem them for cash directly from the FSCC

(an entity which would still remain under Perkins’ plan.) The farmers would of course still be able to receive money from their respective wholesale or grocer partners in business.

The popularity of the prospective food stamp plan also brought to light some other issues with the FSCC’s original methods of mass food redistribution. First was pricing: If the FSCC made an improper calculation for the bulk purchase of a commodity, it would have dramatic consequences for the deflation of the price in that market. During the processing time, the foods are still being withheld from the market and for all intents and are purposes “frozen.” The use of the FSCC’s delivery and transportation methodology also entails that foods will wait longer before reaching their final destinations. Foods must be bought, sold, assigned destinations, transported, and given out all before they perish, or else the corporation has made a squandered purchase. Because the FSCC itself did not own any warehouses, the expediency of this processing was of the utmost importance.²³¹ The demand for a food stamp plan was being called for on the basis of efficiency and not just fairness. The FSCC’s inefficiencies received newspaper coverage.²³² The alternative Food Stamp Plan was considered an “enormous improvement over any method of food distribution yet developed.”²³³

The stamp plan was agreed upon by Congress in 1939. As the Food Stamp name suggests, the program relied not on home deliveries but on stamps given to those on relief for the purchase of food. It was expected that the use of these stamps would increase the buying volume of surplus foods

²²⁷ Ibid, 14.

²²⁸ Ibid.

²²⁹ Springer, 66.

²³⁰ Harvey, 15.

²³¹ Harvey, 10.

²³² Springer, 67-69.

²³³ Joanna C. Colcord “Stamps to Move the Surplus”, *Survey Midmonthly* vol. 75 (1939): 3.

buy the poor²³⁴, and would also facilitate the use of grocery stores and wholesalers once again. The issue of private competition with the government, as well as the issue of surplus procurement being prioritized for export over domestic consumption was addressed with this new system of food relief. The plan revealed an added benefit of relief clients being able to choose which surplus goods to purchase.²³⁵

Continuing Perkins' story of success, the first months of the SMA's Food Stamp system proved to accomplish exactly what it had set out to do. The first instance of the program being used was in Rochester, NY in May 1939. By August, Rochester grocers reported a 5-7% increase in business excluding stamp transactions.²³⁶ Another report claimed a substantial increase in sales "above the volume of blue stamps was noted for peaches, cabbage, peas, onions, tomatoes and pears" and estimated that more than a dollar' worth of food was sold for every dollar spent on redeeming blue surplus stamps.²³⁷ Public and state acclaim of the project was positive. In order to apply for the new experimental Stamp Plan program, cities had to halt purchasing FSCC services for surplus distribution under their current methods (whether it be through commissary or delivery) and agree to solely enact the new SMA Stamp rules, yet by 1940, nearly 700 cities had applied to do so.²³⁸ The SMA continued the trend of quality control as well, and reported that it could better identify which surplus commodities were in demand and which were more likely to be consumed and in which areas. Interactions of the demand for surplus butter in the presence of

surplus pork lard could be measured for the first time.²³⁹ The quality and scope of foods being made available for relief significantly improved. All in all, social workers and clients alike agreed that they were receiving "more and better" food stuffs under the food stamp plan than with prior direct distribution methods.²⁴⁰ Other tasks used with the funding after the establishment of the SMA include the use of surpluses to aid development in new industrial uses from farm products, and the purchase of foods via public schools in the very first (and very brief and limited in scope) pilot public school lunch experiments.²⁴¹

The Stamp Plan was surely the most widely accepted and least contested form of food relief developed in the 1930s. While undoubtedly the idea of food relief in general had become more popular by 1940 among consumers and legislators alike, food relief programs still had major drawbacks that were not by any clear evidence in threat of being addressed soon. One of the lasting criticisms of early food relief was that the Government's purchasing of foods—even when redistributed- *did* in fact raise their prices. Even the Stamp Plan arguably changed the price of commodities when paid for with cash. The market became much more favorable for the farmer, but also became less favorable for the buyer. In theory, the poor were lifted from this burden by means of public assistance, but not everyone who was poor received public assistance. Many Americans "were hanging on to [economic] independence by the skin of their teeth"²⁴² during the Great Depression, and were not pleased when they watched

²³⁴ "Food Stamps, April 1," *Business Week*, 1939.

²³⁵ "Food Stamp Plan Makes Hit," *Business Week*, 1939.

²³⁶ Colcord, 2.

²³⁷ Perkins, 16.

²³⁸ Perkins, 11.

²³⁹ *Ibid*, 13.

²⁴⁰ Colcord, 2.

²⁴¹ Perkins, 17.

²⁴² Springer, 70.

their paychecks go to foods that they paid more for, undoubtedly as a result of Federal procurement, while those on relief received not only free foods but also other relief commodities reduced in price such as suits, coats, and cots. What became of the millions who earned a low wage and did not receive food relief is not well documented, but it can be said that the purchasing of commodities by the Federal Government resulted in many poor working Americans facing higher prices.²⁴³ Finally, despite the changing attitudes about the duty to relieve poverty, accusations of thriftless and immoral behavior on the behalf of the poor persisted throughout all of the depression. Conservative attitudes about personal responsibility were ingrained into the American psyche and would not be easily eroded. Even FDR, sounding much like his predecessor Hoover, admitted that his hometown was shirking its community responsibility and neglected to help its neighbors the way it had done years before.²⁴⁴

The end of America's first experimentation with food assistance are at first curious. Criticism of its actions were persistent but mainly ideological. It cannot be said that public welfare was not needed or abandoned in total, since the return of state assistance would be seen again in the 1960's, and that would include a brand new Food Stamp Plan. However, like many of the economic woes of the 1930s and early 1940s, government assistance and pervasiveness in the economy disappeared in the aftermath of World War Two. Why should such a successful corporation -- frequently praised for being marginally unlike other Federal institutions -- be abandoned?²⁴⁵ After all, food relief was the only widespread Federal relief measure approved by Hoover, *and* the

only form of commodity redistribution that producers and marketers could stand to tolerate. Yet in retrospect, the first food relief programs were not really designed to test the limits of government. They also were not designed to permanently support the poor. They were most definitely not designed to replace the conventional economics of a capitalist America indefinitely to aid farmers and consumers. The first food assistance programs were born during the consequential paradox of co-existing hunger and agricultural surplus. The FSCC's direct distribution and Food Stamp Plans provided an answer to this conundrum during The Great Depression, but after this period of economic turmoil had ended, neither the hunger nor the surplus persisted. The Federal Government's successful food stamp program was abandoned because wartime consumption, overseas exportation of food, and rapid employment of Americans for the war effort sealed both ends of a paradox which seemed to cause one another.²⁴⁶ Could a successful food stamp program have been reestablished immediately after the war? Perhaps. But it would take a political will to help the poor (regardless of surplus measures) to do that, one which simply did not exist in 1945. The revival of food relief would be briefly discussed in every Congress after its demise, but the urban voting public's disinterest with agricultural policy in the postwar world -which it found complex and arcane- led to a lack of action until concern over America's poor reached the spotlight once again with the election of John Kennedy.

The food relief plans of The Great Depression illustrate how America's democracy functions as a reactionary government, and its continued history beyond the 1930s shows that food assistance

²⁴³ Harvey, 33.

²⁴⁴ Poppendieck, 210.

²⁴⁵ Harvey, *Want In the Midst of Plenty*, 26.

²⁴⁶ Poppendieck, 241.

policy has relied on the state of the poor indefinitely, yet it is interesting how the interests of farmers, retailers, businessmen, and common citizens all managed to make impactful impressions on the radical legislation. The use of surplus goods to help feed those in America's most pressing time of unexplainable crisis also shows the ingenuity and openness of some of America's lawmakers. The United States may never see a more progressive time in its legislative history, but its examples may be used as outlines for public policy for generations to come.



Meeting or Beating Gendered Expectations during the Holocaust

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HST 362: Nazi Germany and the Holocaust

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During the Nazi Regime, Nazi officials looked for more efficient ways to ‘solve the Jewish problem’ with the Nazi idealization of the master race and Lebensraum. Imprisonment, exploitation, and death of Nazi outsiders began as early as 1933 with the opening in Dachau. In the early years, men were more likely to be selected for the eventual death in labor camps, but as the years progressed, the expansion of the camp systems took place, ghettos became overcrowded, the war with the Allies became more brutal, and mass murder of Nazi outsiders became the easy solution for Nazi officials. As the mass killings began, many officers hesitated at the command to slaughter women and children, but ruthless volunteer killers were never hard

to find. Men and women were humiliated in different ways based on their gender identity, and perpetrators, victims, and bystanders faced different challenges based off of their gender as the years progressed. The role of perpetrators, victims, and bystanders during the Holocaust was specified and shaped by gendered expectations of the Third Reich, which determined how the atrocities committed affected them throughout the regime.

At the early stages of the Final Solution, there was confusion and hesitation among the perpetrators of the mass murder on how to conduct themselves when following out orders to kill. The hesitation among the killers was greatly based on gender roles. Lieutenant

Heinz Buchmann of Reserve Police Battalion 101, learned about an up incoming order to massacre the village of Josefow where all women, children, and elderly were to be shot on the spot. Buchmann explained to Lieutenant Hagen that “as a Hamburg business man and reserve lieutenant, he would in no case participate in such an action, in which defenseless women and children are shot”.²⁴⁷ In Buchmann’s case, he showed some signs that his beliefs were not wholly enveloped by Nazi perversions of manhood as being violent. In Buchmann’s case, he saw himself as an honorable German that could not justify killing women and children, at the least, and their Jewishness was irrelevant.

Gender also affected perpetrators of the mass killing during the Third Reich greatly because of how ideas about ‘proper’ behavior of men and women influenced the occupations available to men and women. The specific gender expectations in Nazi Germany affected the career path of men and women early in their development with education through the Hitler Youth. Hitler Youth membership was required for all “Aryan” German Youth from ages 10 to 18. Hitler youth- both boys and girls- “were to be guided and strengthened by physical activity, education, and sports”, gaining confidence, self-esteem, and political enthusiasm. Yet at the age of fourteen, the programs shifted so that the boys received training preparing them for military action, political involvement, yet

the girls received “training in health, child care, domestic skills, and self-improvement in preparation for motherhood, domesticity, and comradeship in marriage”.²⁴⁸ The division in the Hitler Youth based on gender roles reflects the division in German and Nazi employment. Men received more military positions and more often acted directly in the mass murder of Nazi outsiders while women were expected to play more domestic roles.

However, despite gendered teachings, many women sought to play an active role in Nazi agendas. There were even both female and male SS guards who brutalized prisoners of the concentration camps and death camps.²⁴⁹ Many women tried to encourage Nazi ideology by becoming teachers through the Hitler youth. For example, Melita Maschmann of the League of German Girls, was eager to be a part of German colonization of Poland, and to ‘improve’ the Polish land where she thought “the noble, refined and intellectual qualities were everywhere in danger of being suppressed by the brutality of the primitive”, referring to the Polish.²⁵⁰ Melita was supportive of the Nazi ideals of race and space, and tried to do her part to assist in the colonization of Poland, but was limited as a perpetrator based on gender expectations that kept her from having a more direct impact as a perpetrator. However, in some cases, a person’s occupation made them a

²⁴⁷ Christopher R. Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1992, 1998), 56.

²⁴⁸ Ursula Mahlendorf, *The Shame of Survival: Working Through a Nazi Childhood* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009) 94-95.

²⁴⁹ Doris L. Bergen, *War and Genocide: A Concise History of the Holocaust* (Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2009), 227.

²⁵⁰ Melita Maschmann, “A German Colonizer of Poland in 1939 or 1940”, from *Account Rendered: A dossier on My Former Self*, 1963, 114-115.

perpetrator without them even realizing. In the Siauliai ghetto, where Jews were forbidden to have children, women were forced to have abortions. A woman in her eighth month of pregnancy was forced to have a premature birth at the hands of the doctor, while the nurse was to kill the child “in such a way that she would not know the nature of the act”.²⁵¹ If the statement held true, this woman was a direct perpetrator, but was made unaware of the fact due to her gender and employment position, thereby blurring the lines between bystander and perpetrator.

Gender affected the perpetrators of the mass killing in Nazi Germany in varying ways based on the idea that Nazi Germany was so entrenched in violence, that violence became a significant factor for sexuality. Ursula Mahlendorf remembers the only sexual education she received in the League of German Girls was from her instructor who said, “When your future husband makes you a mother, he will put his member into you like a sword thrusts itself into its sheath, and his seed will impregnate the ovum in your belly”.²⁵² This violent rhetoric made Ursula more afraid and confused about sex in general, and even more terrified when Nazi propagators used rape or sexual intimidation as a political statement. The map that Melita Maschmann’s father had of Europe illustrates propagation of foreign sexual aggressors, by showing a crying baby girl, Germany, about to be overrun by a strong baby boy, Poland, to represent the need for Germany to raise the birth rate to

protect Germany in the effort towards race and space.²⁵³ Fear of sexual intimidation influenced some women to encourage destruction of ‘enemies’ who they thought were rapists. Ursula Mahlendorf almost became a direct perpetrator herself when she was a nurse in a hospital where two orderlies were prepping a Russian POW for surgery, and told her “that the Russians are rapists” and that they would kill “the dog” if she wanted. Had she not been interrupted by another doctor, Paul, she reports that she would have told them to kill the Russian soldier.²⁵⁴ The scenario with Ursula and the two soldiers reflects a common occurrence in Nazi Germany where male perpetrators would try to appeal to or impress the woman in their life with evidence of their violence towards outsiders by sending home pictures of themselves next to piles of dead Nazi outsiders²⁵⁵ or letters from the Eastern front describing their ‘masculine’ “achievements...in the battle against these subhumans [population of the Soviet Union]”.²⁵⁶

Male victims of the Nazi persecution who were trying to hide from Nazi perpetrators or pass as ‘Aryan’ struggled in different ways than female victims. Circumcision of Jewish men left them at risk for discovery since most non-Jewish men of Eastern Europe at this time very rarely were circumcised, and with physical examination, Jewish men were easily discovered. This was a fear Jewish men had that Jewish women did not. In Warsaw, about two-thirds of Jews hiding

²⁵¹ Raul Hilberg, “Two Thousand Years of Jewish Appeasement” From *The Holocaust*, ed. Donald Niewyk (Boston: Wadsworth, 2011), 146.

²⁵² Mahlendorf, 123.

²⁵³ Maschmann, “A German Colonizer of Poland in 1939 or 1940”, 114.

²⁵⁴ Mahlendorf, 210.

²⁵⁵ Bergen, *War and Genocide: A Concise History of the Holocaust*, 148.

²⁵⁶ Karl Fuchs, “A German Soldier’s Letters from the Eastern Front”, Letter, 1941, 119-124.

on the Aryan side were women,²⁵⁷ which reflects the difficulty men had trying to pass, especially by 1943 when most German 'Aryan' men within the age range for the military were drafted. Therefore, Jewish men were more likely to be stopped out of suspicion and, without false identification, less likely to pass for 'Aryan'.²⁵⁸

Female victims of Nazi persecution struggled and lived with fear in different ways than male victims when going into hiding. Female outsiders in hiding were vulnerable to sexual assault and persecution, which would go unpunished. Fanya Gottesfeld Heller described how her aunt was raped in front of her uncle when the gestapo couldn't find Heller, and how the few members of her family she told didn't believe her.²⁵⁹ Heller's story represents the risk of sexual assault at the hands of Nazi perpetrators, but women in hiding were also at great risk to be sexually exploited by people who understood their vulnerability and took advantage of their opportunity for unpunished sexual assault and coercion. Joan Ringelheim wrote of a Jewish survivor "Pauline" who was molested by male family members of the people who hid her, and she was kept silent by threat of denouncement. Pauline told Ringelheim "I can feel the fear... Sometimes I think it was equally frightening as the Germans. It became within me a tremendous... I didn't know how... what to do. I had nobody to talk about it".²⁶⁰ Pauline's experience represents a unique circumstance of

isolation, fear, and victimization more commonly familiar and understood by female victims in hiding during the Holocaust. Pauline, like many other women, was unable to seek help and escape her abusers because that would endanger the lives of her family, but lived in torment which she suffered with more than Nazi perpetrators.

Women's and men's experiences as victims of the Holocaust differed in terms of deportation and the camp selection process, as is described by Myrna Goldenberg's statement that men and women shared "different horrors, same hell". From 1939 to 1940, men were more likely to be taken from the Ghettos to the labor camps, and therefore more likely to be killed by Nazi persecutors. However, from 1941 until the end of the war, women were more likely to be selected for death in the expanding system of death camps, especially if these women were pregnant or clinging to small children,²⁶¹ who went directly to death according to survivor, Ruth Kluger, who claimed that "to get out of the camp [Auschwitz], you really had to be alive more than twelve years".²⁶² Female victims of the Holocaust suffered in different ways from men based on the gendered expectation and common reality that women were to be more devoted care takers of their children compared to men. According to survivor Lawrence Langer, most mothers who refused to be separated from their children at Auschwitz-Birkenau and were sent to the gas chambers, sometimes

²⁵⁷ Zoe Vania Waxman, "Women and the Holocaust" From *The Holocaust* ed. Donald Niewyk (Boston: Wadsworth, 2011), 130-131.

²⁵⁸ Marion A. Kaplan, *Between Dignity and Despair* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 203.

²⁵⁹ Waxman, *The Holocaust*, 131.

²⁶⁰ Waxman, *The Holocaust*, 131-132.

²⁶¹ Bergen, *War and Genocide: A concise History of the Holocaust*, 191.

²⁶² Ruth Kluger, *Still Alive: A Holocaust Girlhood Remembered* (New York: Feminist Press, 2001), 149.

against the advice of experienced prisoners to give the children to the elderly who were to be killed along with the children.²⁶³ However, women suffered based on the gendered expectation that women are the primary care-giver for children within their families whether they reflected this expectation in their actions or not. In *This Way to the Gas, Ladies and Gentlemen*, Tadeusz Borowski described how a woman he saw tried to claim a crying child wasn't hers to escape death. A sailor named Andrei, knocked her down, picked her up by her hair, then threw her in the truck that was taking Jews away after saying, "Ah, you bloody Jewess! So you're running from your own child I'll show you, you whore!"²⁶⁴ This woman had already faced tormenting dehumanization at the hands of the Nazis, and saw that she was bound for death if she reminded with her son. Yet, she was shamed for not holding true to the gendered expectations of a moral mother by a ruthless figure who was assisting mass murder, and despite the fact that she was facing a completely immoral and senseless environment.

Concentration and death camp prisoners, male and female, were vulnerable to sexual assault and exploitation, despite the fact that published testimonies of sexual assault of male victims in the camps are less common. Many women, such as Judith Magyar Isaacson, were terrified of the vulnerability to rape inside the camps, which Isaacson described in her book *Seed of Sarah*.²⁶⁵ There are published testimonies of the fear woman had of

vulnerability to molestation, which could reflect that men were less aware of their own vulnerability due to the fact that women were more often raised to be aware of their sexual vulnerability more so than men, or could reflect lack of testimony. However, men were also vulnerable to sexual assault in the camps. Roman Frister was raped by another prisoner in Auschwitz at age 15, as he described in his book, *The Cap or the Price of a Life*. The title of this book refers to the cap which his molester stole from him, which Frister replaced by stealing another cap, which may have resulted in the death of another prisoner, for prisoners without caps were shot.²⁶⁶ Frister was vulnerable to rape and theft which almost led to his death, and did lead to the death of another. Frister suffered from the psychological and physical abuse of rape, which he was vulnerable to inside the camp, where every Nazi outsider was little more than an animal to the Nazi persecutors, especially as the war and violence progressed over time. The only qualifier is that more women have reported sexual assault in the camps, yet there are millions of untold stories and experiences that will forever go unreported.

Methods of humiliation, demoralization, and dehumanization often differed during the Holocaust in a gendered form. Photos of Battalion 101 officers smiling next to Jewish elders on kneeling on the ground testify to the joy Nazi persecutors found in humiliating their victims.²⁶⁷ Older Jewish men were targeted by the Police Battalion 309 soldiers for humiliation due to the elders'

²⁶³ Waxman, "Women and the Holocaust", 135.

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ Bergen, *War and Genocide: A Concise History of the Holocaust*, 226.

²⁶⁶ Waxman, "Women and the Holocaust", 133.

²⁶⁷ Christopher R. Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1992, 1998), 40-41.

position of respect. Elderly Jewish men were threatened to dance before the officers, and if the men did not dance as the officers wished, the Jewish men would have their beards set on fire.²⁶⁸ The elderly men were targeted because of the position of masculine power in their Jewish culture, and by forcing the Jewish men to dance and lighting their beards on fire, the Nazis tormented the elderly men in ways that specially related to their sense of morality as men.

Female victims suffered humiliation in different ways than male victims at the hands of the Nazis. Photos of smiling reserve police of Battalion 101 at the around women at the “undressing barracks” testify the gendered humiliation of victims. The “undressing barracks” were a humiliating part of the deportation process which was implemented by Lt. Gnade in Fall of 1942 when the Miedzyrzec ghetto was subjected to brutal “clearing operations” which meant that the Order Police strip searched the Jews for valuables.²⁶⁹ When this part of the deportation process was introduced in 1942, men would be completely naked while women would sometimes be allowed to keep so underclothes on,²⁷⁰ but eventually with the escalation of the war, gender had less of an influence on how the victims were treated and everyone would be completely naked in the process of entering the camps. Zoe Vania Waxmen states that a comparative study of the

testimonies of male and female victims shows that more women describe “the agony of having to stand naked in front of men, of being searched for hidden valuables, of being subjected to obscene remarks, of being shorn of all their hair, and being tattooed”.²⁷¹ Female victims were traumatized and humiliated by strip searches because of their socially constructed ideals of their own identity, humanity, and womanhood grounded in religion and modesty. Rena Korneich Gelissen described her tearful devastation from the strip searching and tattooing with the understanding that “Our traditions, our beliefs, are scorned and ridiculed by the acts they commit”.²⁷² Even though the victims were forced into the strip searches, they felt ashamed, and the humiliating exposure they faced is reported to have had a more apparent influence of humiliation for the female victims of the Holocaust.

In the cases where victims were homosexual or in a ‘privileged marriage’, women were persecuted less aggressively than men. Nazis persecuted homosexuals because Nazis saw that homosexuality could lead to the “end of the Germanic world”²⁷³. However, lesbians were not seen as a threat to the birthrate due to the argument that lesbians would not “lastingly withdraw from normal sexual relations”²⁷⁴, or women could just be forced to have children, which the Nazis showed with their implementation of the Lebensborn program.²⁷⁵ Jews in mixed

²⁶⁸ Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, “Hitler’s Willing Executioners” From *The Holocaust: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation* (3rd Ed.) ed. Donald L. Niewyk (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2003), 93.

²⁶⁹ Christopher R. Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland*, 40-41.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 82.

²⁷¹ Waxman, “Women and the Holocaust”, 138.

²⁷² *Ibid*.

²⁷³ Heinrich Himmler, “On the Question of Homosexuality”, speech to the SS-Gruppenfuhrer, February 18, 1937, 94.

²⁷⁴ Robert G Moeller, *The Nazi State and German Society: A Brief History with Documents* (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2010), 93.

²⁷⁵ Mahlendorf, *The Shame of Survival: Working Through a Nazi Childhood*, 198.

marriages were more protected than other Jewish people until the 1944, for the Nazi officials feared protest from 'Aryan Germans' who would be offended by the persecution of Jewish people they are related to. Ursula Buttner argues that Jewish people in mixed marriages were going to be killed and the end of the war saved them, which reflects the events of increased deportation of Jewish people from mixed marriages in 1945.²⁷⁶ Similar to male homosexuals, Jewish men in mixed marriages were at greater risk for persecution than Jewish women in mixed marriages because the household was defined by the male figurehead.²⁷⁷ However, increased deportation at the start of 1945 shows how persecution of all outsiders escalated aggressively. Nazi officials disregarded gender even more, which Himmler illustrates with his 1943 statement that "Whether 10,000 Russian females fall down from exhaustion while digging an anti-tank ditch interests me only in so far as the anti-tank ditch for Germany is finished".²⁷⁸ Himmler statement provides an exemplary representation of the fact that in the later stages of the Final Solution, gender made no difference in the agenda of 'war of annihilation' in the sense that every victim was to die, but there was a large differentiation in murder method.

Gendered limitations for employment and the fight for economic survival in war time influenced how female bystanders knew about Nazi crimes against outsiders in different ways, and how the individuals reacted to

the knowledge. Ursula Mahlendorf's mother expressed after the war that she had been worried about Ursula's enthusiasm for Hitler, yet, when she opposed Ursula's request that she join the Women's League or become a party member, all her mother said was "I cannot afford the time for anything except making a living for us".²⁷⁹ Ursula's mother may have opposed the regime, but as a single mother, may have felt as though she could not risk voices her opinions to her daughter because of the enthusiasm Ursula held. However, her mother may have just not cared enough about politics when she had a family to raise, which had been sent into poverty with the death of her husband.²⁸⁰

Female bystanders who opposed the oppression of outsiders may have felt pressure to stay silent due to the gendered expectation that women remain politically conscious, but not voice their opinions against the politically dominant 'Aryan' male. When Teresa Stangl learned of her husband, Franz Stangl's involvement of administration in the T-4 program, she was disturbed by the knowledge, could not have sex with him, and moved away to continue the marriage at a distance. However, she expressed inconsistencies in later interviews by saying that her husband would have given up his work had she asked, and later saying she could not have stopped him from being involved.²⁸¹ Teresa's inability to voice her political and moral opinion to her husband reflects a troubling gender dynamic of the Nazi regime. If Teresa

²⁷⁶ Marion A. Kaplan, *Between Dignity and Despair: Jewish Life in Nazi Germany* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 191-197.

²⁷⁷ Kaplan, *Between Dignity and Despair: Jewish Life in Nazi Germany*, 149.

²⁷⁸ Bergen, *War and Genocide: A Concise History of the Holocaust*, 171.

²⁷⁹ Mahlendorf, *The Shame of Survival: Working through a Nazi Childhood*, 115.

²⁸⁰ *Ibid*, 58.

²⁸¹ Bergen, *War and Genocide: A Concise History of the Holocaust*, 193.

was sickened by her husband's affairs as she claims, she may not have voiced her thoughts about his actions because she felt politically powerless and fearful of the Nazi political influence.

Female bystanders of the Holocaust were affected by sexual exploitation and rape within the chaos of war. The obsessive emphasis that the Nazis put on the issue of 'race and space' led to the development of the Lebensborn program where "women of supposedly pure Germanic stock encouraged to have children with blond Aryan SS men", which they would have the children in state clinics to give the child to Nazi training institutions when they reached school age.²⁸² The Lebensborn program exemplifies a gender specific effect of the Holocaust for female bystanders. Female bystanders faced sexual exploitation and fear at the hands of the state and invading Allies. Ursula Mahlendorf witnessed many women being taken by Russian soldiers in the middle of the night to be raped, and a reported 7.1 percent of women of childbearing age had been examined in clinics after one or several rapes by Russian soldiers following the fall of the Third Reich.²⁸³ Vulnerability to and fear of sexual exploitation was a concern that affected female bystanders of the Holocaust more so than male bystanders of the Holocaust according to the mathematic figures of Russian liberation and personal testimony.

Nazi tactics of outsider persecution evolved with the increased violence through the years of World War II. The original hesitation that some of the perpetrators had when facing the order to kill women and children did not stop the

ruthless slaughter of massive populations of men, women, and children. Men may have been more likely to meet their death in the labor camps, but with the development of the gas chamber executions, women were more likely to be killed with their children by gas. Gender did not influence who died, but gender influenced how the victims would be humiliated, demoralized, and murdered. Both men and women acted as perpetrators to the mass killing, but gendered expectations meant men had the dominant role in the atrocities, despite the attempts of some women to elevate themselves within the Nazi party. Yet, often when female bystanders opposed Nazi politics, their own understanding of gendered expectations kept them from speaking out against the regime, whereas male bystanders that spoke against the violence of the regime would fear appearing like an un-masculine traitor. Gendered expectations of the Third Reich specified and shaped the role of perpetrators, victims, and bystanders during the Holocaust, which determined how the atrocities committed affected them throughout the regime.

²⁸² Mahlendorf, *The Shame of Survival: Working Through a Nazi Childhood*, 198.

²⁸³ *Ibid*, 220.